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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
ANTITRUST: JEFFERSON, MADISON,
HAMILTON, AND THOMAS C. ARTHUR
PAUL H. BRIETZKE*
In an influential 1986 article,' Thomas Arthur argues against a "con-
stitutionalization" of antitrust. Courts have, he contends, ignored the clear
legislative history of the Sherman Act,' instead treating this statute as a
"blank check." According to Arthur, judicial interpretations turned this
Act into a "standardless delegation," with courts constantly encroaching
upon the legislative sphere while making antitrust policy "wholesale." This
setting "sail on a sea of doubt" makes litigation costly and its results uncer-
tain. In such a climate, advising antitrust clients is equally speculative.'
Arthur's analyses are powerful, in no small measure because he ignores the
"multi-valued social/political approach" to antitrust that attracted a great
deal of interest a few years ago." Instead, he pursues a unitary and inter-
nally consistent approach that is distinct from, yet broadly in agreement
with, that of the Chicago School of law and economics. 5 I will argue that,
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. This article is drawn from research for my
forthcoming book, THE IDEOLOGIES OF ANTITRUST. I am grateful for an NEH Summer Grant
under the late Bob Cover at Yale Law School and a Summer Research Grant from Valparaiso
University. These grants made my research possible.
1. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Arthur, supra note 1, at 267-69, 277, 290, 297, 375. See also id. at 308: "[n~either
precedent nor original legislative intent governed Sherman Act cases. What did govern was the
Supreme Court's view of the public interest."
4. Id. at 320. See also, e.g., Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Eco-
nomic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977). Cf
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Schwartz,
Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 4 (1960).
5. Arthur, supra note 1, at 367: "Courts cannot pick and choose among noneconomic
policy arguments, permitting some and condemning others, without engaging in inappropriate
legislative policymaking." (But why would a choice among contemporary economic policies be
more appropriate?) Many of Arthur's analyses revolve around his interpretations of United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). These analyses echo Chicago
School preoccupations. See also id. at 301, quoted infra text accompanying note 93. Compare
this formulation with Judge Taft's: Addyston, 85 F. at 280, 282-83, quoted in part, infra text
accompanying note 89. See also Arthur, supra note 1, at 346, 351 (discussing and applying R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 63, 129 (1978)).
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once the politics of antitrust are taken into account, the constitutionaliza-
tion of antitrust becomes desirable and even inevitable; we need an eco-
nomic constitution that corresponds with our political one. This constitu-
tionalization is very different from Arthur's, and I will first describe it in
sections I-III of my article. I will then try to join issue with Arthur in
sections IV-V, to offer a commentary on many of his thoughtful arguments.
I. JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON
Arthur's approach to his topic is historical, and a history of antitrust
law should also be an economic history. Such a history would be simplistic
if it reduced everything to a struggle between agrarian and industrial inter-
ests, between ideological Jeffersons and ideological Hamiltons. But a prop-
erly-qualified analysis of antitrust as based on the ideas of these worthies,
highlights our awareness of living in a Hamiltonian world, while yearning
for the Jeffersonian world that can be recaptured only in bits and pieces.'
The Jeffersonian desire is to diffuse wealth and power, to protect "small,
local, responsible" businesses from "large, politically irresponsible, absen-
tee-owned, and possibly corrupt giants."'7 Judge Bork satirizes this attitude
6. C. CRAMER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: FREE AND NOT So FREE 14 (1972); Scheiber,
Public Economic Policy and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives, 1980 Wis.
L. REV. 1159, 1172. North versus South, capital versus labor, agriculture versus industry -
each juxtaposition has an element of truth. But the central opposition of elements is more
accurately stated as lying between a pre-industrial spirit and a cosmopolitan spirit: Jefferson,
Calhoun, Henry George, and LaFollette versus Hamilton, Webster, Theodore Roosevelt, and
the F.D.R. of the early New Deal. Bunzel, The General Ideology of American Small Busi-
ness, 70 POL. Sci. Q. 87, 90 (1955).
According to R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 231
(1976):
[W]e . . . have had to embrace two unreconciled ideologies, one for public declamation,
the other for private use. The one is radically egalitarian and if pursued would demand a
revolutionary transformation in the whole structure of our society; the other is radically
hierarchical and its pursuit has in fact led to a revolutionary transformation of the whole
agrarian structure of society that prevailed before the Civil War. [H]ierarchical relation-
ships play in the lives of ordinary people a decisive part that Jefferson . . . or Jackson
• . . would have said was irreconcilable with democracy and hardly distinguishable from
tyranny.
Building on similar ideas, B. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO
1945, 231 (1983), concludes that:
Our acceptance of the consequences of industrialism and technology no longer allows us
to regard the agrarian past as an alternative, and perhaps heightens the agonies and the
uncertainties. Americans still resist the controls that modern technology seems to require.
We still rest our faith on some kind of populism, an inner sense of rightness of individual
choice over scientific knowledge and community self-control over a benevolent manage-
ment by the state [and, presumably, by large corporations].
7. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 109(b) (1978). See also C. KAYSEN
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 17-18 (1965) (antitrust is "firmly anchored in Jeffersonian
socio-political commitments"); Berthoff, Independence and Enterprise: Small Business in the
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as a futile yearning for an "independent yeomanry," s a yearning that can
readily be seen at work in the opinions of the elder Justice Harlan, Justices
Brandeis and Douglas, Chief Justice Warren, and Judge Learned Hand,
and in many arguments by government officials over the years.9
The Hamiltonian ideal found its modern organizational home in the
large corporations organized after the Civil War and, later, in trade as-
sociations, in elite business schools and their ideology of "managerialism,''1 0
American Dream, in SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 28 (S. Bruchy ed. 1980) (Jefferso-
nian ideal is to have the largest feasible number of independent enterprises, bending their knee
only to divine providence); Bunzel, supra note 6, at 99.
8. R. BORK, supra note 5, at 54.
9. See FTC v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (Douglas, J.); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (Warren, C.J.); Standard Oil of Califor-
nia v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas J., dissenting); American Column
and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Stan-
dard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand).
10. Managerialism records the effects of a "Managerial Revolution" in the running of
large businesses. It applies business school techniques that in part rationalize and civilize the
blatant predacity of the "robber barons"; most management decisions are turned into technical
problems rather than deep value questions. Managerialism reinterprets laissez faire by adding
cooperation, among nominal competitors and between business and government, to the list of
business values: optimism, individualism, traditionalism, pragmatism, and materalism. That
these are also the quintessentially American values testifies to this country's status as a "busi-
ness civilization." Managerialism faces a dilemma while promoting the long-term business
planning dictated by its professional canons, under competitive conditions which make such
planning impossible or at least uncertain of result. This dilemma is usually resolved through
the taming of markets that facilitates private planning but is frowned upon by antitrust offi-
cials. Business relations with government create tensions within managerialism, since it is diffi-
cult to buy into Leviathan for some purposes and not others. When cooperation succeeds and
privileges and subsidies flow to a corporation from government, this is regarded as the ordinary
state of affairs. The failure of cooperation (e.g., an antitrust prosecution) is seen to result in a
government "intervention" which destroys business "confidence." Managerialism is in more or
less constant battle with the bureaucratic ideology described infra at note 15. R. BELLAH,
HABITS OF THE HEART 47 (1985); T. COCHRAN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM: A HISTOR-
ICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1900-1955, at 3 (1957); H. COMMANGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 19
(1950); E. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 47, 53 (1969); H. LASKI,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 165, 170, 172, 186, 191 (1948); 1 M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILI-
ZATION 312 (1957); A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE POWER 376 (1965); F. SUTTON, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED 285-86,
327 (1956).
The most striking thing about managerialism is its persistence over time. Statements by
its devotees from the 1920s could have been wrtten by Milton Friedman or F.A. Hayek. To-
day, corporate ideologues write and speak as if the 1960s and 1970s never happened, drawing
their inspiration from the 1950s that were, under Eisenhower, a coming to terms with the New
Deal. Trade association ideologies of the 1920s were used almost intact by a big business
defending against new antitrust attacks from the 1950s onwards. Perhaps the best short list of
the benefits claimed for managerialism comes from Hawley, Essay, in HERBERT HOOVER AND
THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 3, 5 (J. Huthmacher & W. Susman eds. 1973): "The
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in Wall Street law firms, and most recently in the Chicago School of law
and economics." These organizations constantly argue for the Hamiltonian
business boosterism that is typified by Herbert Hoover's tenure as Secretary
of Commerce. According to this theory, through a selective laissez faire
government is to help but not hinder business by curing democratic threats
to "property" and by fertilizing a national "efficiency" in economic activity.
As Hamilton recommended, government socialized or partly subsidized
many business risks, while most business benefits remained in private
hands. In reality, however, business pursues its Hamiltonian ends pragmati-
cally, by whatever means promise a quick profit, and frequently portrays
this process as an unselective laissez faire that is more consistent with Jef-
ferson's ideas.1 2
It took longer for the Jeffersonian ideal to find its modern organiza-
tional home. This lag, both a cause and effect of the early dominance of
Hamiltonian business arguments, accounts for many characteristics of early
antitrust decisions, characteristics that still influence us today.' s Jefferson's
disciples sought a genuine political equality and believed in the power of
reason to guide experiments in liberty. But they were handicapped in the
pursuit of these ends by their belief as to means: the best government is the
least government. Although Populists and Progressives, Jefferson's heirs,
came to see governmental intervention, Hamiltonian means, as indispensible
to progress, they were unable to organize this intervention effectively. The
outcome would be a technically innovative yet regulated, stable and secure system, rationalized
and directed by competent, scientific experts, composed of efficient, smally cooperating func-
tional units, and filled with cooperative individuals conforming to group standards and meshing
into the overall machine."
11. See infra notes 94, 116, 173 and accompanying text.
12. H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 34, 44 (1909); D. HINSHAW, HERBERT
HOOVER: AMERICAN QUAKER 125-26 (1950); R. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVISM IN
AN AGE OF ENTERPRISE 23 (1951); G. STEINER, GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC LIFE 137,
145 (1953); Votaw, Traditional Business Concepts v. Reality: The Role of the State in the
Gap Between, in THE CORPORATE DILEMMA: TRADITIONAL VALUES VERSUS CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 142, 143 (D. Votaw & S. Sethi eds. 1973); Beer, The Idea of a Nation, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 19, & 26, 1982, at 23, 24. See C. CRAMER, supra note 6, at 406; C. DAHL &
C. LINDBLOM, supra note 6, at 231, quoted supra at note 6; id. at 482; M. LERNER, IDEAS
ARE WEAPONS 447 (1939) (Jeffersonian natural rights conscripted to serve the doctrine of
vested rights that reduced state and federal regulatory powers over business); Scheiber, supra
note 6, at 1162 (a study of state mercantilism in Ohio); F. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 190;
Bunzell, supra note 6, at 99-100 (Hamiltonian drift away from the "independents" in proprie-
torship). THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 21 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966) [hereinafter THE
FEDERALIST], finds that, as a mercantilist, Hamilton favored government aid to manufacturing
and banking, and opposed what would later be called humanitarian aid to the underprivileged.
13. See infra notes 84, 89, 93-94, 108, 114-15, 119-21, 130 and accompanying text. The
critical features of the large corporation were in place by 1910, and perhaps as early as 1890,
while an equivalent but "upstart" bureaucratization of government had to wait until late in the
1920s. This time lag was in part responsible for the early pro-business "tilt" in antitrust
decisions.
[Vol. 22
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New Deal accelerated the gradual infiltration of the Jeffersonian ideal with
Hamiltonian means, allowing the ideal to find its methods and organiza-
tional power base in administrative agencies and elite law schools. Summa-
rizing this process, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace told Louisiana
farmers in 1935 that the New Deal enabled ordinary people to fight back
against Hamiltonians - with Hamiltonian weapons. 4
The history of the New Deal is one of a drift from aggressive to more
modest Hamiltonian means, a drift to an increased emphasis on antitrust as
the sporadic and unintrusive regulatory scheme described below. 6 Like an-
14. P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 181 (1982) (quoting Wallace). The New
Deal's Agricultural Adjustment Administration "lawyers, spiritual and political heirs of the
Jeffersonian tradition in their personal views . . . [appeared] before the Supreme Court to
defend their statute wrapped in Hamilton's mantle." Id. See also Ekirch, American Intellec-
tual History, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 2, 13 (C. MacFarland ed.
1970); i. HOROWITZ, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA IN THE UNITED STATES: 1956-1976, at 177
(1977); B. KARL, supra note 6, at 22, 120-21; J. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LE-
GITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 74 (1986) (for Woodrow Wilson, the desire to re-
spond positively to the problems of complex society recalled the need for the Hamiltonian
government described in The Federalist No. 72 as "adequate to the exigencies of the union");
A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at 307 (quoting Schlesinger's Age of Jackson).
15. Like legislators, judges, and many business executives, government administrators
portray themselves as disinterested servants of the people rather than of selfish private inter-
ests. Under their Welfare or Reform Liberalism, a Progressive idealism implemented during
the New Deal and after, the market is in a more or less permanent need of state intervention.
The regulatory schemes of government administrators will work well if they are designed well
since, by analogy with many business school and law school teachings, the administration of
antitrust, etc. enforcement is merely the instrumental application of a professional expertise
and creativity to democratically-determined ends. R. BELLAH, supra note 10, at 212; J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
58 (1978); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 12 (1938); E. REDFORD, ADMINISTRA-
TION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROLS 229-30, 232 (1952); J. ROHR, supra note 14, at
175, 184; Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1298
(1984).
The foundation for an activst enforcement of antitrust was provided by L. BRANDEIS, THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS (0. Fraenkel ed. 1934) (first published prior to
World War I), and by A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (the separation of ownership and control in the corporation). Thurmond
Arnold quickly carried these ideas into practical effect when he was appointed to head the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 1938. Some of the conceptual tools for doing
this were provided by Harvard law professors Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, by the
Brownlow Report, and by the various reports of the Temporary National Economic Commit-
tee. Arnold and his successors did antitrust battle with the managerialism described supra at
note 10. They had the immense advantage of arguing before two long-serving devotees of an
administrative expertise, Justices Black and Douglas. The "curse of bigness" ideology, of an
administrative expertise in detecting antitrust violations, was almost always successful in the
courts from 1940 to 1975. In outline, the argument came to be that one or a few firms regu-
larly raise prices by restricting output, through either monopoly or an explicit or tacit collu-
sion. The excessive profits which are the object of this exercise reflect barriers to entry created
by defendants (barriers against new producers entering the market), rather than efficiency or
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titrust officials, business executives claim to pursue a mainstream Ameri-
canism consisting of moderately Jeffersonian ends through a few Jefferso-
nian and many Hamiltonian means."8 These rival claims give rise to what
Clarence Cramer calls "the basic dilemma in economics as well as in polit-
ics: we want governmental action, yet we abhor it. We want a free econ-
omy, but we want certain regulations. Inevitably, it has been the abuse of
freedoms that leads to the demands for controls .... ."I' Reflected in this
"dilemma" are the perennial questions of whether ostensibly democratic
ends justify often rather elitist means, whether the means will subvert the
ends, and how committed the parties are to announced ends in the first
place.
II. MADISON'S SCHEME AND ITS WEAKNESSES
Constantly considering these perennial questions while refereeing anti-
trust claims, courts have adopted rather Madisonian means for dealing with
Cramer's dilemma. Less ideological than Jefferson or Hamilton, Madison
pragmatically addressed the classic problem of liberal political theory: How
can state neutrality be maintained in a world seen to be dominated by con-
flicting private and public claims? How, in other words, can government be
kept at arm's length from both Hamilton's special interests of business and
the threats of security and property posed by Jeffersonian democrats?
With some justification over the long history of antitrust, judges feel
economies of scale. Fewer products sold at higher prices increase unemployment and inflation-
ary pressures, and much business activity thus results in a loss in public welfare. M. DIMOCK
& H. HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS 109 (1940) (Tempo-
rary Nationhl Economic Committee Monograph No. 11); Edwards, Large Enterprises and
Public Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD COMPETITION 9, 12-13 (1962); Joffe, Beyond Anti-
trust, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 59-63 (1978); McCraw, Regulation in America, 49 Bus. HIST.
REV. 159, 162 (1975); Schwartz, Book Review, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the
Antitrust Treatises, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 244-45 (1979); B. KARL, supra note 6, at 121-
22; Mason, Introduction, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 16 (E. Mason, ed.
1970); J. ROHR, supra note 14, at 134-57. See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (Brownlow Report), 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937).
16. R. HEILBRONER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 168 (1977); R.
HUBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF SUCCESS 386 (1971); J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY: DIFFERENT MODES OF BARGAINING AMONG INTERESTS 14-15
(1982) [hereinafter J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY]; I M. LER-
NER, Supra note 10, at 409-10 (discussing Herbert Croly's definition, presumably from 1909,
of an American "welfare state" pursuing Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means, so as
to respond to the felt exigencies of industrial society); Samuelson, Economic Thought and the
New Industrialism, in PATHS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 219, 226-27 (A. Schlesinger & M.
White eds. 1963); Beer, supra note 12, at 24-25; Scheiber, supra note 6, at 1161.
17. C. CRAMER, supra note 6, at 406. One cause of this "dilemma" is that
"[b]usinessmen, from Hamilton on, have never opposed government aid to business, only gov-
ernment hindrance in business affairs." Id. (emphasis in original).
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themselves less likely to abuse power than do private or public bureaucrats.
The federal judiciary thus appointed itself the balance wheel of antitrust,
inclining first to one side and then another to counteract ambition with am-
bition while maintaining what particular judges perceive as a state neutral-
ity. However, judges' perceptions change from time to time, and this has a
significant effect on the drift of antitrust policy. A partly instinctive judicial
choice of the middle ground creates a self-maintaining process which keeps
factions occupied with playing the antitrust game, which moderates the ex-
tremities of partisanship that might otherwise endanger democratic
processes. 18 This judicial choice of a middle ground is evident in the anti-
trust opinions of Justice McReynolds, whose perceptions of state neutrality
are staging a bit of a comeback, and in the antitrust opinions of the Burger
Court (1970-1987).'
By adopting a middle ground, courts sometimes keep Hamiltonians
and Jeffersonians from becoming judges in their own cause. Courts thus
reduce the likelihood that judgments will be biased and integrity corrupted,
as was Madison's expressed hope in The Federalist No. 10. A shrewd and
experienced political manipulator, Madison justified a scheme which sur-
vives today under very different circumstances. Summarized briefly, the
goal of The Federalist No. 10 is to legitimate government activity by elimi-
nating some of the opportunities for "instability, injustice, and confusion."
The chief functions of Madison's scheme are to "break and control" the
vice of faction.20 According to Madison, specialization within government
creates the rivalry among interests that helps keep government too weak to
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 134 (J. Madison); id. at 132 (justice
holds the balance between debtors and creditors, and over questions of encouraging manufac-
turing and apportioning taxes); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of the Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 310 (1978).
See also C. ARGYRIS, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 156 (1960); T. ARNOLD,
THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 116 (1940) ("[t]he pull against a balance wheel is always
greatest when the balance wheel is most needed."); K. DOLBEARE & P. DOLBEARE, AMERICAN
IDEOLOGIES 45 (1971); M. LERNER, supra note 12, at 432 n.11 (citing Charles Beard,
Madison's "awareness of the relation between economic interest and political action was strik-
ing"); A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at 334 (quoting Edward Mason, relations between gov-
ernmental and business leadership are more distant in the U.S. than in France, Holland, or
Britain); infra note 60 and accompanying text. Quoting Walton Hamilton's description of the
Sherman Act, T. ARNOLD, supra, at 138, notes that: "How to grant power and withhold dis-
cretion is an age-old enigma, just as likely to be solved as squaring the circle. . . . It was
James Madison, the father of the Constitution - not Karl Marx - who taught that the
function of policy is to obtain a just balance among the interests which make up the
commonwealth."
19. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (Mc-
Reynolds, J.); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (McReynolds,
J.); P. BRIETZKE, THE IDEOLOGIES OF ANTITRUST chs. 5A, 5B, 8B, 8C (forthcoming). See also
infra notes 27, 129 and accompanying text.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 129-32 (J. Madison).
1988]
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abuse rights. Further, he feels that factions, what we now call single-inter-
est groups, are inevitable because of self-love, fallible reasons, and the une-
qual distribution of property. Madison thus takes advantage of the Ameri-
can fondness, echoed by the Chicago School of law and economics, for
explaining almost all actions in terms of self-interest, that undemanding
standard that is easy to understand because it defers to human
weaknesses."
For Madison, factions are organized around a common passion or in-
terest adverse to what The Federalist No. 10 calls "the permanent and ag-
gregate interests of the community."22 Accordingly, the causes of faction
cannot be eliminated without enforcing the uniformity of opinion and prop-
erty-holding that destroys liberty. (This is the result many business critics
ascribe to an activist enforcement of antitrust laws.) Therefore, the best
that Madison's government can do is to control effects by rendering factions
"unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression,"2 sug-
gesting Madison's anticipation of the need for something like Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.2 ' Madison's creativity lies in his desire to channel pas-
sions through the very same instruments that excite them. Like the anti-
21. Id.; G. CAVANAUGH, AMERICAN BUSINESS VALUES IN TRANSITION 8 (1976); L.
EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 7 (1961); E. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 293; P.
NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 42
(1978); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 5 (1960). But see also United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (Marshall, J.):
If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for
greater competition in another portion, this too is a decision that must be made by Con-
gress and not by private forces or by the courts. Private forces are too keenly aware of
their own interests in making such decisions and courts are ill-equipped and ill-situated
for such decision making.
Id. at 611.
Madison's vice of faction/pluralism/natural balance wheel "model" enables us to see the
full breadth and depth of interest group activty in a fluid, predominantly middle-class, society.
It is thus a much richer model than Marx's or the muckraking indictments in, e.g., "the 'world
according to Nader.' " P. NAVARRO, THE POLICY GAME: How SPECIAL INTERESTS AND IDEO-
LOGUES ARE STEALING AMERICA 3-6 (1984) (discussing ideas of Arthur Bentley and David
Truman). See also M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 124 (1965) (Truman's and
Bentley's belief that group equilibrium is just and otherwise desirable).
Madison was preoccupied with instability and injustice in Greek city-states, medieval cit-
ies, and early modern Europe. The scarcity of The Federalist discussions of the general wel-
fare and the meaning of justice does not support the conclusion that its authors advocated
laissez faire or rugged American individalism. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, supra note 12, at 20-
21, 31 (A. Hamilton). When factions oppress the weak, "anarchy may as truly be said to reign
as in a state of nature." Avoiding this anarchy leads factions to submit to a government which
protects the weak as well as themselves, and to participate in large coalitions only if these
favor principles of justice. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 12, at 358-59 (J. Madison).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 130 (J. Madison).
23. Id. at 133.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See infra note 82.
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trust laws, Madison's scheme retains a broad right to organize while regu-
lating some organizational means and ends. Starting or joining an
organization thus became a popular way to augment the individual's power
for the playing of factional games.25
In Madison's time, liberty of business as well as of conscience thrived
on the divided authority an atomistic competition afforded. Through much
of the nineteenth century, Jefferson's and Jackson's disciples - farmers
and small town businessmen - mobilized fury against Hamiltonian organi-
zations that violated their expectations of a diffusion of property and power.
Yet Madison's "classic liberal notion of a society of free, equal, competing
individuals" was gradually shoved aside by the emerging reality of free,
often unequal, and ferociously competing interest groups.2" The Civil War
shook our faith in a just and self-correcting harmony of interests. State and
local rivalries abated more quickly in business than in politics. A national
and, later, a multinational economic system came to straddle a decentral-
ized political order. Madison could not foresee the technological and organi-
zational imperatives that began to press for political recognition and re-
ward. Until recently, America was virtually the only country to achieve
democracy before passing over the economic development "hump" and, late
in the nineteenth century, many saw this hump as putting democracy at
risk. Madison's political system was unable to absorb so large an economic
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 130-33 (J. Madison); id. at 358 (aim at
"so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority
of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable"); Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 8 (citing
Tocqueville).
Wills traces a crucial Madisonian insight back to David Hume:
Honour is a great check upon mankind; But where a considerable body of men act to-
gether, this check is, in a great measure, removed, since a man is sure to be approved of
by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise
the clamours of adversaries.
G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 190-91 (1981) (quoting Hume's "On the
Independency of Parliament"). The values to be protected by The Federalist No. 10 exist in a
"density of weave" which is "disjunctive yet correlative, inclusive yet distinguishable - pri-
vate right and common good," public and private faith and liberty, rules of justice and rights
of the minor party, distrust of public engagements and alarm for private rights, etc. Id. at 257.
26. H. DRUCKER, THE POLITICAL USES OF IDEOLOGY 129 (1974). See also E. EPSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 302; Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARA-
NOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 196 (1965); Kirshen, The Rela-
tion Between Liberty and Legal Duty, 35 MAINE BULL. 27, 28 (1932).
Madison made an unstated assumption that he was describing and coping with autono-
mous individuals; no provision was made for pluralistic social groups. A. MILLER, DEMO-
CRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL 144 (1981). The criti-
cisms of Madison's system in the text notwithstanding, democratic procedures are still fairly
effective, and there is the appearance and often the reality of multiple access points to the
political system and of a regional, ethnic, cultural, and economic diversity. See J. SCHNEIDER,
IDEOLOGICAL COALITIONS IN CONGRESS 21 (1979).
1988]
Brietzke: The Constitutionalization of Antitrust:  Jefferson, Madison, Hami
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
284 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
transformation quickly enough to prevent concentrations of power. 7
Because large corporations have the advantages of organization, wealth
with which to finance pressures on government, patronage, influence over
the mass media, and a backlog of claimed successes in performing public
functions, they frequently had, and continue to have, their way. There were
few credible challenges to business power until the Depression, and reforms
were kept within the safe confines of business ideals such as competition. In
1938, James Landis argued that rates, wages, conditions, and the resolution
of employee and public grievances are:
in fact governance. . . . [Blecause of the rapidity and direct-
ness of their execution, the penalties that private management
can impose possess a coercive force and effect that government
even with its threat of incarceration cannot equal. [United
States Steel] either by itself or in combination . . . can virtually
determine what policies with reference to production and sale of
steel we shall pursue as a nation. 8
Worried about factions arising from an unequal ability to acquire
property, Madison and many others did not attend to the inequality of con-
trol over property that confers much greater actual power through such
organizations as corporations and administrative agencies. Even if this
power is not exercised, or is exercised in ways consistent with the public
interest, fears of a future malevolence remain. In The Federalist No. 51,
Madison terms this state of affairs the "precarious security" offered by "he-
reditary or self-appointed authority"; 9 the antitrust analogue seeks to curb
27. Hofstadter, supra note 26, at 196; A. MILLER, supra note 26, at 69-148; K. DE
SCHWEINITZ, INDUSTRY AND DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC NECESSITIES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILI-
TIES 142 (1964). The "happy consequence" Madison assumed in The Federalist No. 10, that
small groups will arise naturally but fail to coalesce, was regularly disproved. P. STEINBERGER,
IDEOLOGY AND THE URBAN CRISIS 106 (1985). In the 1920s, the economist Walton Hamilton
remarked on the paradox of a diffusion of political power combined with a concentration of
wealth and economic prestige. This combination subordinated public welfare to organized
wealth and the drive to exploit technology and economies of scale. 5 J. DORFMAN, THE ECO-
NOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 435-36 (1951) (quoting Hamilton).
28. J. LANDIS, supra note 15, at 11. See also E. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 191, 212; J.
HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, supra note 16, at 118; E. KEARNY,
THURMOND ARNOLD, SOCIAL CRITIC: THE SATIRICAL CHALLENGE TO ORTHODOXY 82 (1970);
H. LASKI, supra note 10; at 389; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 4. Statements analogous to Lan-
dis' can also be made about government agencies:
Strengthened by the dependence of government on their skills and allegiance, often re-
moved from direct civilian control, these agencies acquire the power and the opportunity
to further their own organizational interests. . . .In effect, the state shares its "monop-
oly" with the coercive apparatus it has created.
P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 21, at 42-43.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 12, at 358 (J. Madison). See also G. KOLKO,
WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA 68-69 (1962) (even if managers "act benevolently toward
[Vol. 22
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economic power in its "incipiency." Dissenting in United States v. Colum-
bia Steel 0 in 1948, Justice Douglas put it thusly:
The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that . . . [i]ndustrialized
power should be . . .scattered into many hands so that the for-
tunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or ca-
price, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few
self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but
respectable and social-minded is irrelevant.3"
The checks and balances of federalism and a separation of powers
leave governmental power fragmented, difficult to mobilize, slow to act, and
tending toward inefficiency and even corruption in economic regulation.
Madison's scheme was thus regularly set aside during the twentieth century
in order to deal with crises like wars and recessions, and to entrench the
policymaking process that often joins legislative committees, administrative
agencies, and organized clienteles in symbiotic relationships.3 ' As Madison
supposed, powerful industries often have conflicting interests that cancel
each other out: railroads collide with trucking companies, and exporters do
battle with importers. But many industry interests and efforts overlap and
reinforce each other in attempts to establish a "good climate" for business
and, often, to veto policies advanced by workers, consumers, environmental-
ists, women, and minorities. Trade associations are particularly effective in
presenting a united front on policy issues. 3
A large number of veto groups have grown up in America over the
their workers and the larger community, their actions still would not be the result of social
control through a formal democratic structure and group participation . . . ; they would be an
arbitrary noblesse oblige by the economic elite."); J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 121 (1978).
30. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
31. Id. at 536 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Though Justice Douglas dissented, his view pre-
vailed when Congress amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act only two years later. See 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1982) which, among other things, allows punishment of incipient violations. Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) also allows punishment for incipient
violations.
32. B. KARL, supra note 6, at 6; C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 94 (1977); A.
MELONE, LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 17 (1977); Salaman &
Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Pub-
lic Policy, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1026, 1030 (1977). See also R. LANE, POLITICAL IDEOL-
OGY: WHY THE AMERICAN COMMON MAN BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES 155 (1962) (checks and
balances in part responsible for the bickering that prevents arrangements from becoming set-
tled); M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO PO-
LITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1964); G. STEINER, supra note 12, at 333 (pressure groups create
confusion, conflict, and weakness in public economic policy). See also infra note 140 and ac-
companying text.
33. R. CHRISTENSON, IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN POLITICS 239 (1973); E. EPSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 72,
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years, each with a mercurial power over particular public policies.
Madison's worst fears, of what we would now call the corporate state34 or
fascism, have not been realized. But our political system cannot set priori-
ties until it has purchased, with subsidies and other privileges, the acquies-
cence of each group capable of vetoing a particular program. Veto groups
have no right to dominate a particular governmental structure or function,
for their powers have not been explicitly surrendered by the broader public.
They therefore cannot be held accountable under Madison's scheme; they
cannot be defeated by the "regular vote" that The Federalist No. 10 pro-
posed as the main remedy. 5
Economic and bureaucratic power are disliked and feared in part be-
cause they are veiled in the mystery of private meetings and are not sub-
jected to public participation and debate. Hopes for checks and balances to
emerge within organizations unlikely to be run along Montesquieu's lines,
hopes enshrined in corporations law and administrative law, have frequently
provided futile.36 Further, checks and balances cannot have anything like
34. I.e., political representation by and administration through industrial-occupational
groups, rather than by territorial divisions. M. OLSON, supra note 21, at 113. This was a
concern in the U.S. from the 1920s onwards, and is reflected in the early trade association
cases and the Schechter case that held that the National Recovery Administration was uncon-
stitutional. Bunzell, supra note 6, at 100; Ward, Comparative Economic Systems, 5 POL.
STUD. REV. ANN. 198, 203 (. Horowitz ed. 1981).
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 132 (J. Madison). See THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, supra note 12, at 357 (J. Madison) (power is legitimate when "surrendered by the
people"); P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 21, at 42-43, quoted supra at note 28;
Stedman, Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Public Policy, in THE POLICY VACUUM 135,
151-52 (R. Spadaro ed. 1975); G. STEINER, supra note 12, at 334 (quoting Douglas, J.)
("[tihe gravest danger we face today is economic and political disintegration into competitive
groups, each placing its own interests above the national interest").
According to Shonfield:
[Pirivate enterprise has had some striking successes in actually capturing a number of
enclaves inside the structure of the Federal government. And even where its marauding
parties have not been able to establish full rights of conquest, they do seem in several
instances to have taken up permanent residence inside and to be living on terms of equal-
ity with those officially in charge.
A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at 334. Late in the New Deal, the adoption of a Keynesian
model of economic recovery was delayed by business hostilities caused in part by antitrust
policies. B. KARL, supra note 6, at 159.
36. T. ARNOLD, supra note 18, at 97, 110; J. LANDIS, supra note 15, at 10. There is
factionalism in all organizations, of course. Developing arguments similar to Madison's, D.
LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA (1953), finds a great deal of decentralization and
competition within large corporations. Latham finds that corporate oligarchies are moderated
by the appearance of "party factions" brandishing democratic symbols. Latham, The Body
Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 218, 222 (E. Mason
ed. 1970).
For Eisenberg, corporations law is a constitutional law, regulating parties' rights and du-
ties and delimiting corporate power in relation to the outside world. M. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976). See also Chayes, The Modern
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their desired effects without an effective challenger on each side of an issue.
The automatic check assumed by theories of countervailing power, that
strong groups consistently arise to oppose similar groups, frequently does
not materialize. Some would-be veto groups are poorly organized, "unor-
ganized, or as in the case of the poor, unorganizable." Such groups "stayed
out in the cold, away from the American banquet,""7 although business and
government agencies sometimes purport to represent their interests.
Madison's scheme is brilliant but far from perfect. Unlike antitrust
law, it does not attempt to define abuses by factions or identify who is au-
thorized to declare an abuse. If, as Madison suggests in his The Federalist
No. 49, opinion is the basis of faction, how can government control factions
when opinion fuels factions in government? How, in other words, can par-
ticularistic interests be kept in check by a government that in no small mea-
sure derives its power from their support? Madison's scheme operated to
give some groups a check on state power, while giving the state few correla-
tive checks on group power. The market was apparently to provide some of
these correlative checks. For Willard Hurst:
[O]ur tradition relied as much on the impersonally competitive
market to prevent abuse of private economic power as on [our]
Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25 (19th cen-
tury model of a corporation as a republic in miniature); Frug, sypra note 15, at 1378 (some
corporate checks and balances in proxy fights, shareholders' derivative suits, and the market
for corporate control). Yet business has no effective separation of powers, independent agen-
cies, or, often, policies which cancel each other out. R. LANE, THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS-
MEN 84 (1954). In the 1930s, courts began to recognize the separation of corporate ownership
from control that removes many checks which formerly curbed abuses of power and wealth.
See Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, supra note 15.
Attempts were also made to create internal checks and balances in, for example, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission:
The very existence of a five-man Commission of divided political affiliations and differing
philosophies, combined with the intervention of an administrative process through which
varying internal views of staff personnel are manifested, gives multiple safeguards against
misjudgment ....
Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Policy: Guideposts to a Revised Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L.
REV. 1139, 1220 (1952). But the "principal-agent relationship is especially diffuse in bureau-
cratic organizations"; government bureaucrats rarely if ever take orders from citizens or deter-
mine objectives on the basis of citizen desires. Leibenstein, Microeconomics and X-Efficiency
Theory, PUBLIC INTEREST, special issue, 1980, at 97, 107. Like their corporate counterparts,
governmental bureaucrats are captains of 10s, 100s, and 1000s. With their organizational
power to prevent or retard action and their official position protected by law, they rival the
power of political chiefs. A. BERLE, POWER 314 (1969).
37. P. NAVARRO, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting Thomas McCraw). See also P. Ascii,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 110 (1970); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE
POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 363 (1966). It is sometimes argued that "restraints of
trade" make subsidies for unorganized groups necessary. These subsidies can pyramid, so as to
threaten political institutions. T. ARNOLD, supra note 18, at 127.
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constitutional limitations to prevent abuse of public power ....
This proposition was present, though mostly implied, in the early
years when the simple conditions of society offered little occa-
sion to bring the matter to explicit statement.38
Therefore, until it was perceived to fail frequently late in the nineteenth
century, the market justified private purposes. It helped keep them aligned
with public purposes and subject to public control by consumers rather than
by voters.
III. How CONSTITUTIONALIZATION CAME TO ANTITRUST
Our political system left room for attempts at the legal rehabilitation
of markets. In The Federalist No. 51, Madison conceded that "[t]he provi-
sion for defense must . . . be made commensurate to the danger of at-
tack. . . . It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroach-
ments, by still further precautions." In The Federalist No. 10, "the
principal task of modern legislation" is described as "the regulation of...
various and interfering interests." The antitrust legislation of 1890, 1914,
and 1950 lies squarely within this Madisonian tradition, for it helps com-
plete the "partial agency" in each other's activities that Madison's The
Federalist No. 47 found essential to "Effective Control."3 9 Business had
acquired a variable and uncertain but very real influence over government
38. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 41 (1970) [hereinafter J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION]. See also R. BELLAH, supra note 10, at 50 (Americans "suspect all
groups powerful enough to avoid the operation of the free market."); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 29 (1956); J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY,
supra note 16, at 67 (the market helps "keep social peace by contributing to a humane balance
of power between government and private interests and by promoting constructive outlets for
creative energy"), 118 (the "qualifed legal autonomy of the market" made it "not the least
source of external curbs on official power."); R. NADER & M. GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 4 (1973); G. STEINER, supra note 12, at 335 (quoting V.0. Key); G. WILLS, supra
note 25, at 29. A "politics of interest groups and small-constituency units is unlikely to develop
its own checks." Government can provide the checks, but not "if it is broken into units corre-
sponding to the interests which have developed power." G. MCCONNELL, supra note 37, at
363.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 131 (J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No.
51, supra note 12, at 356-57 (J. Madison); M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON, & J. PALAMOUNTAIN,
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 915 (3d ed. 1959); G. WILLS, supra note 25, at
119 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 12 (J. Madison)). See also THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 51, supra note 12, at 356 (J. Madison) (each governmental unit must be given "the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others.");
R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 6, at 480 (Americans value the goal of reciprocal con-
trol highly); N. PRESTON, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND POWER 82 (1967). Like the "pure de-
mocracy" discussed in THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 133 (J. Madison), a selec-
tive laissez faire arguably offers "no cure for the mischiefs of faction" under conditions we
might today describe as those of a market failure.
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de facto, and government had to be given a modest de jure influence over
business through a policing of markets. Just as public authority was weak-
ened by its division under the Constitution, so too must private power be
kept divided through tile antitrust laws. But this had to be done cautiously,
maintaining the kind of delicate balance associated with the Constitution to
"avoid both the Scylla of private monopoly and the Charybdis of statism. '"40
We would lose rather than gain from a court-sponsored transfer of power
from economic royalists to political royalists.
The regulation of corporate power raises acute questions of feasibility
and fairness, so the need arose for a sensitive economic federalism analo-
gous to the political one. Ideally under such a system alternate sources of
power would be identified and protected, yet prevented from becoming ad-
ditional veto groups that would create still more governmental paralysis.
The number of industrial and governmental leadership positions would in-
crease. This would create the additional access and control points that stim-
ulate diversity and experimentation. The innovations that would result
would force responses from groups which otherwise enjoy the quiet life, se-
cure in their unaccountable power. Conflicts of group interest could then
serve as the vehicles for reform and progress sought by the likes of Judge
Wyzanski and the Progressive economist John R. Commons."' For example,
40. E. KINTER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER xiv (2d ed. 1973).
41. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (for Judge Wyzanski, antitrust speaks "to the industrial
and political ideals of an open society founded on the faith that tomorrow will produce a better
than the best"); M. OLSON, supra note 21, at 115 (discussing ideas of J.R. Commons and
G.D.H. Cole). See also Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPO-
RATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (E. Mason ed. 1970); M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON & J.
PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 39, at 579; I. HOROWITZ, supra note 14, at 167; Brodley, Book
Review, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1972). See generally A. BERLE, supra note 36, at 144
(power limited by alternate sources of its supply); A. BRETON & R. WINTROBE, THE LOGIC OF
BUREAUCRATIC CONDUCT 109 (1982); H. COMMANGER, supra note 10, at 338-39 (early in the
twentieth century, there developed a perceived need for a new, experimental public administra-
tion, to break through a rigid separation of powers and political dependence); E. EPSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 188 (quoting E.E. Schattschneider, the "function of democracy has been to
provide the public with . . . an alternative power system, which can be used to counterbalance
the economic power."); J. LANDIS, supra note 15, at II ("it is only intelligent realism for
[regulation] to follow the industrial rather than the political analogue"); D. TRUMAN, supra
note 21, at 437; Zinn, Introduction, in NEW DEAL THOUGHT XV, XXV (H. Zinn ed. 1966)
("[t]he Madisonian argument that political stability would be assured in a federal republic of
many states . . . applied also in the economic sphere, where no single economic interest, fierce
as it might be in its own domain, ever developed a concern wide enough to embrace society at
large."); Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of
Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1566-67 (1984) (antitrust as an "instrument of state-
craft for a pluralistic polity," which "maintains a balance of enterprise and power").
Key facts about America are that mobility and federalism also extend to the economy,
and that the Constitution set up a national common market. Friedman, Law and Small Busi-
ness in the United States: One Hundred Years of Struggle and Accommodation, in SMALL
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the recent growth of treble damage antitrust suits brought by private plain-
tiffs increases the number of control points over private activity, and private
plaintiffs promote a range of antitrust policies which often differ signifi-
cantly from government's.
Antitrust responds to what Willard Hurst calls our "constitutional
ideal." This ideal is the stubbornly-persistent demand that organized power
be accountable to someone other than the immediate power-holder or to
something impersonal, such as an effective market. Claims of competence
and caring, and of fidelity and fiduciary responsibility, do not satisfy the
ideal by themselves. Outside actors and forces must develop and impose
standards. These standards require power to be used rationally, in ways
responsive to our changing perceptions of a democratic society, and with a
"humane regard for the worth and dignity of individuals." '42
In such a system, consumers, shareholders, directors, managers, gov-
ernment officials, congressional committees, courts, and some other groups
such as Ralph Nader's, are all would-be agents of accountability for the
general public. All perform essential functions, yet all operate under differ-
ing disabilities and unaccountabilities. Their overlapping rivalries are thus
essential for a society eager to forestall concentrations of unaccountable
power. (America and, since World War II, Germany thus pursue activist
BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 305, 306 (S. Bruchy ed. 1980). Knee-jerk responses to economic
problems - get government off our backs or decentralize the economy - are unrealistic.
Rather, we must, in the manner recommended by Tocqueville, strengthen associations and
movements by which individuals influence and moderate government action. Filling the gap
between citizen and state with an active participation will moderate the isolating tendencies of
private ambition and the despotic proclivities of government. R. BELLAH, supra note 10, at
211-12.
42. J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, supra note 16, at 97.
See also H. COMMANGER, supra note 10, at 222-23 (Walter Lippmann saw a distinctively
American faith in law as a regulator and director of the socio-economic system, and in a
"Higher Law" - "the denial that men may be arbitrary in human transactions"); J. HURST,
LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, supra note 16, at 111; J. HURST, LAW AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 45-46 (1977); id. at 242-43 (trends in corporate and
administrative law and practice worked against the constitutional ideal; shareholders' concern
is limited to dividends and capital gains and is implemented by buying and selling shares; and
directors' information is often limited); id. at 270-71 (under the ideal, legal processes en-
courage an examination of values and of the meaning and effectiveness of social relations); A.
NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 47 (2d ed. 1970) (American public opinion is
"first, that private unaccountable persons should not wield significant amounts of economic
power; secondly, that should they seek to do so, they should be checked by a rule of law.");
Hurst, Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary Legal Order, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 224,
224-28 (1971); Leibenstein, supra note 36, at 107 quoted supra at note 36. See also Samuels,
The Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee
Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 352 (1973). Hale wrote that: "Somebody must in the nature
of things have the power to act arbitrarily - the company, the legislature, the commission or
the court. I find it hard to predict in whose hands the power is least likely to be abused." Id.
[Vol. 22
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"antitrust" policies; France and Britain, more tolerant of a concentrated
power, use narrower and more passive schemes). Our constitutional ideal
means that power can rarely be seized by the frontal attack of, for example,
a coup in the Third World. Rival agents of accountability will almost auto-
matically slide into effective opposition before the groundwork for seizure
can be laid. Rivals frequently seek the right to leadership by attacking an-
other group, by trading charges of "populist" and "monopolist" in antitrust
matters. During the Progressive Era, for example, Midwestern bankers
sought to re-establish their power by attacking the "Wall Street sharks."43
The constitutional ideal and the ideal of economic federalism are large
chunks of what amounts to our unwritten or English-style constitution."" In
an influential book published the same year as the Sherman Act, 1890,
Christopher Tiedeman finds that:
[The] flesh and blood of the Constitution, instead of its skeleton,
is here, as well as elsewhere, unwritten; not to be found in the
instrument promulgated by a constitutional convention, but in
the decisions of the courts and the acts of the legislature, which
are published and enacted in the enforcement of the written
Constitution. [Thus our] written Constitution. . .is just as flex-
ible, and yields just as readily to the mutations of public opinion
as the unwritten constitution of Great Britain . . . - within the
broad limitations of the written Constitution . . . [which] are
made to mean one thing at one time, and at another time an
altogether different thing.45
43. R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
189 (1962).
44. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975);
G. WILLS, supra note 25, at 267 ("much . ..may be extraconstitutional; may exist in ways
that the Constitution's ratifiers did not have in mind; may have grown up outside the Constitu-
tion's purview"); infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
45. C. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43-44
(1890 & reprint 1974). Charles Merriam, the influential University of Chicago political scien-
tist, wrote in much the same vein: there have been major changes since the enactment of the
Constitution, changes in the balance of power among branches, in federal-state relations, and
in the roles played by political parties, minorities, and women. There is thus a constant need
for the kind of readjustment and reorganization seen in industry. C. MERRIAM, THE WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION AND THE UNWRITTEN ATTITUDE 8-9, 30 (1931). The "Constitution is not an
idol but a spirit; not a form of words but a set of political attitudes and habits of behavior." Id.
at 30.
For Tiedeman, the Constitution defines "the order and structure of the body politic," of
which constitutional law is the "anatomy and physiology." C. TIEDEMAN, supra, at 16. Our
Constitution displays some slight and radical departures from the English constitution, but
English precedents were followed in the many uncontroversial matters considered by the
Framers. Constitutions are effective only so far as they faithfully reflect the national will, id.
at 18, 27, 37, but this does not necessarily mean that Tiedeman would admire contemporary
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These arguments are picked up and applied at some length to antitrust
by Rush Limbaugh:
[Ilnterpretation and application of the antitrust statutes have
followed a course similar to the interpretation and application of
constitutional provisions. The anti-trust acts, like the provisions
of the Constitution, were framed in terms long used in and hav-
ing their foundations on the traditions of the common law. Like
the Constitution, they were designed as a framework and were
meant by their architects to be completed as a permanent struc-
ture by judicial decision in the process of their application and
usage. The judges who first interpreted and applied anti-trust
acts resorted to a consideration of the history of the times when
they were enacted, as they knew that history first-hand and from
experience, just as the judges who first interpreted and applied
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and stat-
utes implementing and giving effect to government until it re-
sorted to a consideration of the history of the times when that
instrument was framed to determine, from their first-hand
knowledge of and experience with that history, what was meant
and intended by those provisions. As the judges, who did not and
who shall not hereafter know first-hand and from experience the
history of the period when anti-trust laws were first enacted, or
who are unwilling to rely solely on their recollection of such his-
tory, resort to a consideration of that history as it is found both
in judicial decisions and in extraneous source material from
which written history is formulated, so judges who are now
called upon to interpret and apply constitutional provisions, long
after the time when the Constitution was framed and ratified,
resort to a consideration of the history of that period as it ap-
pears in judicial decisions and also in extraneous material con-
cerning the history of the times. As the Constitution, because of
its generality and flexibility, through the expediency of judicial
interpretation, has been made adaptable to conditions unfore-
seen by its authors, so the anti-trust legislation which has ex-
isted for more than three score [now one hundred] years,
through the aid of judicial interpretation, has been used to apply
to conditions and to meet problems far beyond the expectation
and the purposes of its authors.
Whether this type of statutory interpretation [in antitrust]
antitrust law. He noted the "extraordinary demands of the great army of discontents" for
social legislation, and he applauded "the disposition of the courts" to "seize hold of the general
provisions of state and federal constitutions in order to invalidate such interferences with pri-
vate rights." Id. at 80-81.
[Vol. 22
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has resulted in judicial legislation, whether it is what Dean
Pound describes as judicial empiricism, whether it is the result
of the arbitrary operation of the dogmatic doctrine of the sepa-
ration of powers, whether it is in keeping with the satirical phi-
losophy of Mr. Dooley that the Supreme Court follows the elec-
tion returns, whether it represents a use of history to deepen the
mysteries of the science of the law or whether it is in fulfillment
of our traditional judicial purpose to adapt by interpretation the
great generalities of our Constitution and legislation to the so-
cial and economic needs of the times, it is so firmly imbedded in
our judicial policy that it is likely to be followed in the applica-
tion of our anti-trust legislation so long as such legislation re-
mains in its present form."
Our formal Constitution is all but silent on issues of institutional com-
petence and on economic matters, particularly the regulation of corpora-
tions and agencies which posed little or no threat when the Constitution was
first promulgated. Like our Constitution but unlike those in, for example,
communist party-states, antitrust is a system of constraint rather than mo-
bilization, of negative proscriptions rather than the positive prescriptions of
more interventionalist regulations and the planned economy. Many anti-
trust rules are "constitutive" - they define the moves and even the game of
economic activity, subject only to restrictions in the formal Constitution it-
self. Antitrust doctrines are much like the unwritten principles the Court
attaches to one vague clause or another in the Constitution: privacy and
substantive due process, for example. Adapting the constitutional tradition
of filling gaps in antitrust laws with what they hope are society's fundamen-
tal principles, the justices seek to balance out many social forces, not
merely the conventional parts of government.47 This balancing is accom-
46. Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REV. 215, 226-27,
229-30 (1953) (citations omitted). See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at 126 (antitrust arguably
reflects the subtle realities, the more innovative and accommodating resiliencies of constitu-
tional practice); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 2 (1982) (congressional practices flesh
out constitutional standards); C. MERRIAM, supra note 45, at 9, 11 (each generation produces
a new constitution through "fundamental changes in spirit and in form," which are "effected"
by interpretation, statute, or common custom). infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
According to Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI.
L. REV. 567, 570 (1947): "Federalism, the separation of Church and State, capitalism, the
antitrust tradition, the separation of powers, [and the autonomy of educational bodies] - all
• ..betray the same jealous preoccupation with the problem of power. . . .We are anarchists
by inheritance."
47. A. BERLE, supra note 36, at 360, 396-97 (Sherman Act is given "quasi-constitu-
tional status," and it is "implemented" by the Clayton Act); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST 4 (1980); M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON, & J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 39, at 614 (anti-
trust is "an accepted, almost revered, part of the basic rules of the game . . . resembling a
constitutional provision"); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 68 (1975) (distinguishing
1988] 293
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plished through what amounts to judicial review of private action: the "leg-
islation" of a cartel or trade association, or the "imperial" presidency of a
large corporation.
Antitrust doctrines seek to describe the liberal democratic economy
that is presumably entailed by a liberal democratic society. There may cur-
rently be a reduced concern over concentrations of market power, but there
is arguably a heightened concern over the distribution of such resources as
information, strategic position, organizational forms, technological skills,
and so forth. The question is whether allocations of decision-making power
which flow from the varying distributions of these resources serve demo-
cratic purposes. Legal theorists like Stephen Burton and Ronald Dworkin
put our constitutional ideal thusly: the "community" wants to know by
what right economic power is exercised, and it demands answers which are
based on legal logic tight enough to leave little room for arbitrary or op-
pressive behavior. 48 This standard leaves unanswered questions about who
gets to define community interests and to evaluate the logic used, questions
that provoke much ideological argument in antitrust. Changes in the eco-
nomic constitution are not necessarily related to those in the political Con-
stitution. For example, the "new federalism" of the 1970s' Burger Court,
which gave the states more latitude, coincided with its "state action" anti-
trust doctrines which curbed states' discretion. The Court later eroded both
sets of doctrines; it expanded the states' economic discretion under the anti-
trust laws while curbing it in other respects.49
constitutive from technical rules); J. VANCISE, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 62 (3d ed.
1975); Arthur, supra note 1, at 328, 329 n.367; Grey, supra note 44, at 714, 716-17; Oppen-
helm, supra note 36, at 1146; Pitofsky, supra note 4, at 1055 (citing Charles Lindblom). See
also G. CAVANAUGH, supra note 21, at 173 ("[the American political system is democratic;
the economic system is aristocratic"); M. LERNER, supra note 12, at 429 (capitalism generated
governmental and public forces hostile to it, and it "became the function of the Court to check
these forces and lay down the lines of economic orthodoxy."); A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at
381 (antitrust is "the authentic expression of the nostalgia for the automatic checks and bal-
ances which used to keep management in its place"); C. TAEUSCH, POLICY AND ETHICS IN
BUSINESS 47 (1931) (the democratic ideal has been extended from political organization to
cover all phases of social life - e.g., education); M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS 289 (1967); Oppenheim, supra note 36, at 1146-47 (antitrust's negative
proscriptions do not seek to displace "the organic checks and balances ... of the economic
system upon which we depend to bring into rough balance the private and public interests").
But see Arthur, supra note 1, at 329 n.367 ("no one has ever claimed" that antitrust values
are so fundamental that they can be explicated in a constitutional fashion).
48. See S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 168-69, 179
(1985); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985);
G. KOLKO, supra note 29, quoted supra at note 29; Joffe, supra note 15, at 35.
49. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision, in
which an unclear but fairly broad state immunity is held to bar application of Fair Labor
Standards Act to state employees), with Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976)
(very narrow "state action" immunity from antitrust laws applied in the same year). The
Court then flip-flopped, broadening state antitrust immunity while narrowing state immunity
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Antitrust laws have survived substantially unchanged for so long as to
become much more than mere statutes. We should thus take seriously the
Supreme Court's frequent characterization of them as an economic consti-
tution. In Appalachian Coals v. United States"0 in 1933, Chief Justice
Hughes reasoned that:
[a]s a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions
which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or
through particularization defeat its purposes by providing loop-
holes for escape. The restrictions the act imposes are not
mechanical or artificial. Its general phases . . . set up the essen-
tial standard of reasonableness. 5'
Thomas Arthur thinks Appalachian is a poor decision,52 and in it the Court
from other types of federal economic regulation. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Usery by 5-4 vote), with Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (applying the broad California
Retail Liquor v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), state action antitrust exemption, to
allow a state to fix trucking rates through consultations with groups of trucking companies
which can agree among themselves) and Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (rent
control ordinance not preempted by federal antitrust laws - a new tack in the Court's
analysis).
50. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
51. Id. at 359-60. See also NBO Indus. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d
262, 279 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom., Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S.
1090 (1977) (there is "danger in permitting statesmen long deceased to control the contempo-
rary meaning of [antitrust] statutes which are almost an economic constitution for our com-
plex national economy"); A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1980) (Sherman Act is like the Constitution in its "brief, broad and
comprehensive language, requiring some judicial construction and many diversified applica-
tions . . . for its practical development"). The "Sherman Act has shown extraordinary elastic-
ity. It may bend at times, but it always bounces back. Thus it is like a constitutional provision
rather than an ordinary statute, and its history tells much about our national attempt to create
an economy . . . both disciplined and free." 1. ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL 122 (1965).
An interesting example of ideological reinterpretation (see infra text accompanying notes
55-64) comes from the Senate's leading current spokesman for a lax antitrust policy: the gen-
erality and adaptability found in Appalachian is not a license to aggrandize government but a
mandate to use power carefully in the service of basic ends. Hatch, Evaluation of Current
Antitrust Enforcement and the Need for Legislation, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 284, 287 (1981).
52. Appalachian is termed an application of the "discretionary rule of reason," devel-
oped by Justice Brandeis in United States v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), "to a
cartel that was thinly disguised as a joint selling agency." Arthur, supra note I, at 306. See
also infra note 91. Appalachian may not have involved "a naked restraint, but surely it was
clad in no more than a string bikini." Arthur, supra note 1, at 342. Perhaps, but Appalachian
arguably required a borderline characterization - of whether the per se rule or rule of reason
should apply, or whether the restraint of trade is naked or ancillary, see infra notes 93-95 and
accompanying text - since Appalachian was decided before Virginia Excelsior focused our
inquiries on the degree of pricing autonomy retained by members of the joint selling agency.
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does seem to be trading on the Constitution as a symbol of wisdom, bal-
ance, and restraint. But a "generality and adaptability" is obviously re-
quired from antitrust law; like the Constitution, its ambiguous criteria must
be applied to ever-changing circumstances of great public import under
conditions of imperfect knowledge. Coming at the end of a conservative
phase, the Appalachian Court may have been trying to deflect the more
radical aspirations Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed a year earlier.
Roosevelt saw "the task of government in relation to business" as one of
assisting in "the development of an economic declaration of rights, an eco-
nomic constitutional order" establishing "the minimum requirement of a
more permanently safe order of things" by, among other initiatives, improv-
ing the distribution of purchasing power.53 Over time, Roosevelt's initial
social democratic vision did not win out over the Court's liberal democratic
vision of our economic constitution. The Roosevelt Court did, however, be-
come progressively more activist in enforcing fairly rigid antitrust proscrip-
tions of economic power.
By 1958 ideas and the ideology of Appalachian were treated as com-
monplace by the Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,54
as well as by one of the heads of the Antitrust Division during the Eisen-
hower Administration.55 By the time United States v. Topco Associates56
was decided in 1972, antitrust had become "the Magna Carta of free enter-
prise," as "important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamen-
See Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958).
In Appalachian, Chief Justice Hughes "began by downplaying the need for a statutory
standard." Arthur, supra note 1, at 307. "This may be so, but only because Hughes was
searching for a constitutional standard with which to, e.g., rebut Roosevelt's demand. See infra
text accompanying note 53. Under the Brandeis/Hughes rule of reason, the Court "must bury
itself in facts and make a subjective judgment of legality." Arthur, supra note 1, at 307. See
also id. at 298-307. True, but I will argue that such subjectivity inheres in any antitrust stan-
dard the Court may adopt - including the one proposed by Arthur. See infra notes 135, 139-
43, 150 and accompanying text.
53. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address, 1932, in AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND IS-
SUES: THE NATIONAL PURPOSE 128, 134 (0. Handlin ed. 1961). See also Marcus, Some Char-
acteristics of Recent Court Decisions Applying the Antitrust Laws, in COMPARATIVE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE THEORY 291, 293 (P. Le Breton ed. 1968) (discussing Section 7 of the Clayton Act);
Blake and Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 382-83 (1965) (the
"strong libertarian streak" in antitrust law, which like securities regulation is unique in posit-
ing a minimum of political interference).
54. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (Black, J.).
55. T. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRA-
TION 50 (1980) (quoting Stanley Barnes, who headed the Division for part of that era who
stated that there is "almost universal" public recognition that the Sherman Act is a "charter
of freedom," a "part of the warp and woof of our economic life" that aims at legal simplcity
and flexibility).
56. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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tal personal freedoms. '8 7 This reference to the Magna Carta is felicitous;
like the Magna Carta, the antitrust laws could be repealed tomorrow. But
repeal would seriously damage the political careers of antitrust's proponents
because the fundamental policies embodied both in the Magna Carta and in
the antitrust laws are so highly esteemed." As with British applications of
the Magna Carta, the Court has remained fairly cautious in antitrust. Since
the Court's "switch in time" in 1937, we have learned that economic free-
doms are not really as important as the "fundamental personal freedoms"
mentioned in Topco, and economic freedoms thus do not receive so zealous
a protection.
Topco goes on to echo the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment: "every business, no matter how small," has "the freedom to
compete - to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster."" The Topco Court in effect an-
nounces a goal of equal opportunity through antitrust, and equal opportu-
nity becomes the most distinctive and compelling element in American ide-
ologies when it is used to tame wealth and power. This philsophy is
embodied in United States v. Terminal Railroad0 and Associated Press v.
United States,61 which required an equal access to "bottleneck" facilities
essential to carrying on a particular business, and United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,"2 which went so far as to call for an "automatic
check and balance from equal forces in the industrial market."" Radiant
Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. and Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange seemed to add a "commercial" due process to antitrust - at
least for a time." In cases like Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
57. Id. at 610. This language has been reaffirmed as recently as 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987). See Topco, 405 U.S. at 611, quoted supra at note 21; FTC v.
Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-economic Goals
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1079 (1979).
58. See C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 45, at 77.
59. Topco, 405 U.S. at 610. Justifying the Robinson-Patman Act (1936), Rep. Wright
Patman argued that this "Magna Carta of small business" would "give equal rights, equal
privileges, and equal benefts to all alike," thereby maintaining "opportunity for all young peo-
ple" and protecting local communities from monopoly control. Berthoff, supra note 7, at 38
(quoting Patman).
60. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
61. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
62. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affid per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
63. Id. at 347 (emphasis supplied); D. RAE, EQUALITIES 64 (1981).
64. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (requirement of notice
and opportunity to be heard before relationship with Exchange terminated, described by some
as a "procedural due process"); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961) (requirement that "objective" criteria be applied by trade association to a
prospective member's application, termed by some a "substantive due process"); Schwartz,
supra note 57, at 1079. See also Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§
1221-1225 (1976), especially §§ 1221(e), 1222. But see Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
19881
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Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,6" California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,66 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,67 the Court, like
Madison, sought to preserve a group's right to seek advantage from govern-
ment while outlawing group actions that prevent other groups from doing
the same.6" The Warren Court (1953-1970) sometimes seemed to display
more concern for the "rights" of individual firms than for establishing the
sufficient conditions of economic rivalry. This spirit is rather subdued on
today's Court, although Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society6
echoes much of this "civil rights" approach to antitrust.7 0
Government is no monolith. Within both state and federal governments
there is a great deal of competition for the "business" of regulating business
among advocates of antitrust and of more interventionist schemes, such as
the detailed regulation of "natural" monopolies like public utilities, thor-
oughly-planned industrial polices, and corporate welfare programs. These
enthusiasms differ chiefly in the extent to which the rivals would replace
market mechanisms with their own efforts. In the Madisonian fashion of
playing each off against the others, business executives, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the courts all seek to be the final arbiter among these bureau-
cratic specializations. A judicial arbitration that creates checks and bal-
ances among regulators is manifest in cases like Silver, Otter Tail Power,
and Philadelphia National Bank." The more interventionalist attempts to
Pacific Stationery and Printing, 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
Samuel Gompers described the Clayton Act (which is primarily about antitrust) as la-
bor's "Magna Carta." 3 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERCAN CIVILIZATION:
1865-1914, at 340 (1949) (quoting Gompers). These analogies are felicitous: Parliament could
significantly amend or even abolish Magna Carta, just as Congress could change the antitrust
laws. But this is not a likely eventuality. These laws have become almost too sacred to touch
- in broad outline. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
65. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
66. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
67. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
68. See B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 34 (1978).
69. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
70. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 13 (1975) ("The
domain of rights is part of the checks and balances on the market designed to preserve values
that are not denominated in dollars."); Gellhorn & Tatum, Making Sense Out of the Rule of
Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155, 162 (1984); Kauper, The "'Warren Court" and the
Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 333 (1968).
71. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963); R. BORK, supra note 5, at 3; H. GORTNER, ADMINISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
39, 42-43, 55 (1977); P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 21, at 42; A. SHONFIELD, supra
note 10, at 376; Frug, supra note 15, at 1374; Green and Nader, Economic Regulation vs.
Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L. J. 871, 876 (1973) (business domi-
nates a regulatory agency through the sheer volume of argument and through the ability to
make initial decisions that place the agency in a defensive position).
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regulate corporations often produce discouraging and confusing results, so
the Court has constitutionalized such antitrust rules as:
the senior controls over American business. [The Court] as-
serted its power to prevent a potentially chaotic situation; . . it
found a fairly well-defined idea system or philosophy embodied
in the Constitution and the history of American democracy; and
• ..it utilized the system of federal courts as an institutional
framework for giving effect to its decrees."
Seeking a doctrine of permissible power, the Court legitimates power
by holding it accountable, by seeing that it is more or less competently and
faiily exercised for public purposes. Court decisions are then subjected to
the kind of academics' "higher criticism" (such as Thomas Arthur's) that is
usually reserved for constitutional law. These academics often find judicial
power to be enhanced if appropriate values and organizational accommoda-
tions are displayed over antitrust, and if decisions are genuinely principled
and "neutral." Antitrust policies must be moderate in order to maintain a
play in their "constitutional" joints and to transcend the immediate result
and the politics of the day.7 Moderation, neutrality, and even craftsman-
ship exist chiefly in the eyes of the beholder, so academics' evaluations help
fuel ideological debates over antitrust.
Despite the purported absolutes and occasional forays into economic
analysis, judicial craftsmanship in antitrust occasionally revolves around the
kind of loose interest balancing seen in constitutional law and in many other
areas. For Justice Blackmun, the balancing of state and federal interests or
"of harm and benefit is .. .a process with which federal courts are well
acquainted in the antitrust field."'7 4 This familiarity seemed to breed the
Burger Court's contempt; concurring and dissenting opinions proliferated as
72. A. BERLE, supra note 36, at 364. See Comment, From Dartmouth College to Bel-
lotti: The Political Career of the American Business Corporation, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 392,
412 (1979) (discussing judicial attempts to apply the Federal Corrupt Practices Act).
73. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines. What are the Sources of
Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV, 1214, 1243 (1977). See also A: BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 49-50 (1976); J. ELY, supra note 47, at 4; A. MASON, THE SU-
PREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 229 (1979) J. ROHR, supra note 14, at 132; G.
STEINER, supra note 12, at 92.
Edward Mason elaborates on the antitrust "doctrine of permissible power":
Some power there has to be, both because of inescapable limitations to the process of
atomization and because power is needed to do the job the American public expects of its
industrial machine. There is no reason, however, to tolerate positions of market power
that can be lessened by appropriate antitrust action unless it can be shown that this
lessening substantially interferes with the job to be done.
M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON, & J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 39, at 612 (quoting Mason).
74. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 611-12 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). See also Boyer, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REV. 971, 977 (1984).
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a deeply divided Court sought to hold power accountable by mechanically
balancing any two or more values that antitrust or constitutional rivals
throw into the hopper. The Burger Court version of principled decision-
making made us painfully aware that outcomes turn on who becomes the
balancer for the moment, and on which ideological promptings will thus
prevail.
There is nevertheless much Madisonian value in the role of the anti-
trust "balance wheel" that the Court explicitly assigned itself in Silver.75
Courts are relatively free of litigants' preoccupations, and judges may thus
have a somewhat clearer vision of the public interest, or at least a some-
what greater sensitivity to widely shared but unorganized interests. Eco-
nomic activities and rival regulatory schemes are moving in many directions
at once. Having properly disclaimed the role of a "brake" upon this process
in Silver, the Court in effect approaches antitrust like a handicapper ap-
proaches a horse race. Courts have decisively rejected theories of counter-
vailing power for antitrust 76 because the courts themselves want to be the
countervailers, to make competitions for antitrust results a little more equal
and to increase judicial power in the process. For example, Congress cre-
ated the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 as a powerful antitrust coun-
terweight to the courts. But courts immediately trimmed the Commission's
power, finding that its "multiple impersonation" of "the role of complain-
ant, judge, jury, and counsel" both violate separation of powers and poach
on the judges' preserve.7 7 Having pruned the FTC too harshly during the
1920s, the courts let the Commission grow slowly to a new vigor and then
selectively pruned it again in the 1980s. 78
The Supreme Court has been more explicit about the constitutionaliza-
tion of antitrust than have academic commentators, although Thomas Ar-
thur disparages the process as one of setting "sail on a sea of doubt. '79
Courts usually pursue, and often give effect to, the constitutional canons of
75. Silver, 373 U.S. at 367. See T. ARNOLD, supra note 18.
76. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372-74 (1933), hinted that the
theory of countervailing power was favored by the Court, but this was later rejected decisively.
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) quoted supra at note 21;
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Sea-
gram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); supra note 37 and accompanying text. See also D. TRU-
MAN, supra note 21, at 486; Wright, supra note 12, at 37.
An excellent example of the antitrust Court-as-handicapper is Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). Ford had merged with Autolite Sparkplugs illegally and, in a
detailed and Draconian remedy, the court handicapped Ford so as to provide Autolite with a
competitive advantage in starting life again as an independent producer.
77. John Bene & Sons v. FTC, 299 F. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1924).
78. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). But see Ethyl Corp. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
79. Arthur, supra note 1, at 266.
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antitrust: moderation, balance, and accountability. The judges' essentially
impossible task is to maintain an ad hoc equilibrium in shifting situations
while at the same time maintaining a consistency in doctrine and results.
This task is complicated by ideologically-charged descriptions of situations
under litigation, and by the difficulty of measuring the effects of a shifting
power and influence directed at narrow areas and shrouded in secrecy. Thus
the only attempts to evade the constitutional ideal that get curbed are those
that are felt to be too bold or otherwise too dangerous. Power plays are
usually kept within manageable bounds, and power itself is kept somewhat
fluid by enforcing occasional changes in conduct, organization, and ideolog-
ical blandishments. Courts scale down their aims so as to maintain a "plu-
ralism": an attempt to control only some of the many effects of a Madis-
onian vice of faction, through a minimal representation of most "affected
interests" and some assurance that no interest is grossly overrepresented.8"
Courts consistently curbed the FTC's power in the 1920s and the power of
certain large corporations and certain associations of corporations from
1940 to 1975. But there has been no sustained attempt to break the vio-
lence of faction, which would require the wholesale restructuring of indus-
tries and government itself. In sum, courts have achieved an imperfect and
uneven, but nonetheless very real and necessary, constitutionalization of
antitrust.
IV. THE INCORPORATION OF INSIGHTS INTO AN ANTITRUST
HODGE-PODGE
Most statutes contain at least one "is" and one "ought," which interact
in complex ways over the life of the statute.81 This doctrine is exemplified in
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.82 In 1890, Congress found the "is" of the
trusts to be inconsistent with the good life. Every agreement in restraint of
trade "ought" therefore to be prohibited. This "ought" was to be derived
from the "is" through what Congress then thought to be the natural means:
80. D. TRUMAN, supra note 21, at 488. See also A. BRETON & R. WINTROBE, supra
note 41, at 109; Hoover, Rugged Individualism, in AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES: THE
NATIONAL PURPOSE 229, 230 (0. Handlin ed. 1961) (excerpted from N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1928, § 1, at 2, col. I.); J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 42, at 244-45; A. ROSE, THE POWER STRUCTURE: POLITICAL PROCESS IN AMERICAN SO-
CIETY 483 (1967); F. SUTTON, supra note 10, at 287-88; M. VILE, supra note 42, at 288.
81. See J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 78-79.
82. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage
in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
1988]
Brietzke: The Constitutionalization of Antitrust:  Jefferson, Madison, Hami
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
302 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
prosecutions in courts. (The only existing federal regulatory agency, the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, was then very new and not widely
trusted.) Exactly how we were to get from the "is" to the "ought" was left
to the courts. Justice Peckham tried to get to the "ought" through a flat-
footed application of the "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Frieght Association:8" the prohibition of
"every" restraint meant just that, every restraint. Business lawyers quickly
disputed Peckham's approach: so broad an "ought" can never be absolute,
just as the phrase "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech" does not mean exactly what it says. A brilliant Circuit Court
Judge who later became President and Chief Justice, William Howard
Taft, came to the rescue in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.8
Finding that Congress had used Sherman Act words in their common law
sense, Taft tried to amend Peckham's "ought" so as to prohibit only unrea-
sonable restraints of trade.
Thomas Arthur would eliminate much of the uncertainty in a constitu-
tionalized antitrust by reinstating Taft's Addyston as the focus for contem-
porary analysis. Arthur's goal is laudable, but his means are rather dubious.
Judge Taft's exercise of judicial power was appropriate only if the words of
the Sherman Act had an agreed common law meaning which was accepted
by Congress. This was not the case; Congress did not know what it wanted
to do in 1890, but it knew enough in 1914 to reject Taft's approach.85 Even
if Addyston was adequate for the world of 1898, so formalistic a common
law treatment of antitrust is an inadequate basis for incorporating subse-
quent political, economic, and doctrinal insights.8 The sources of uncer-
tainty in antitrust are as many and as varied as they are in constitutional
83. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The "plain meaning" rule has been called a tautology: "Words
should be read as saying what they say." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF STATUTES 229 (1975). Arthur, supra note I, at 294-95, argues that this rule was
applied in Trans-Missouri because the defendants did not offer, and Justice Peckham could
not devise for himself, an operational rule of reason standard. I would argue that Peckham
could not devise an adequate standard in 1897 because the main lines of a "purpose and
effect" analysis did not become clear until United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262
U.S. 371 (1923). Plain meaning interpretations survive in a modified form in modern antitrust.
See, e.g., infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
Willard Hurst offers a very different but no less valid view of Trans-Missouri, terming it
a "leading example of the influence of a statutory text in allocating the burden of persuasion
on legislative intent." J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 51. In contrast
to United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aj'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899), which uses the common law as a frame of reference, the frame in Trans-Missouri is
the statute - in a nascent public law approach. See J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, at
48-49; infra notes 84, 88-90, 108, 126 and accompanying text.
84. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
85. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text. But see Arthur, supra note 1, at 272.
86. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
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law, and an Addyston-based analysis would not resolve them effectively. 87
A. Addyston and the Delusive Quest for Original Intent
In Addyston, six manufacturers of cast iron pipe agreed to fix prices
and to allocate some territories among themselves. Judge Taft flatly out-
lawed this conduct.8 8 But he also went further, in the dicta on which Ar-
thur relies. Taft's selected reading of English and American common law
decisions gave rise to the kind of law reform effort we might expect from a
Restatement of Contracts draftsman. The "five classes of covenants in re-
straint of trade" Taft examined show that:
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose
of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the cove-
nantee. . . . The main purpose . . . suggests the measure of
protection needed and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard
by which the validity of such restraints may be judicially deter-
mined. . . . [I]f the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by
the main purpose . . . , it is void for two reasons: First, because
it oppresses the covenantor, without any corresponding benefit to
the covenantee; and second, because it tends to a monopoly."9
The "five classes" of "conventional" restraints that are the basis for
Taft's criteria bear little resemblance to the categories of concern in a con-
temporary antitrust situation.9" His criteria are unlikely to eliminate uncer-
87. See infra notes 133-77 and accompanying text.
88. Taft explained that:
[W]e do not think that at common law there is any question of reasonablness open to the
courts with reference to such a contract [as here]. Its tendency was certainly to give
defendants the power to charge unreasonable prices, had they chosen to do so. But, if it
were important, we should unhesitatingly find that the prices charged in the instances
which were in evidence were unreasonable.
Addyston, 85 F. at 293.
89. Addyston, 85 F. at 282 (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 282-83; infra note 108.
Taft states that "these five classes" do not "include all of those upheld as valid at the common
law; but it would certainly seem to follow" that the criteria he goes on to propose would cover
all "conventional" restraints. Addyston, 85 F. at 282 (emphasis supplied). Taft does not tell us
why this is so, however. In contrast to Arthur's approach, some other antitrust commentators
treat Addyston as part of an insignificant background to the "modern" law.
90. The "five classes" concern:
covenants in partial restraint of trade [which] are generally upheld as valid when
they are agreements (I) by the seller of property or business not to compete with the
buyer . . . ; (2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner
pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere . . . with the business of the firm;
(4) by the buyer of property not to . . . [interfere] with the business retained by the
seller; and (5) by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his master or em-
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tainty as Arthur hopes, by reducing the judicial subjectivity inherent in ex-
tensive fact-based inquiries. 91 Taft's tests require the judge to determine a
"main purpose" which defendants have become skilled at concealing. This
main purpose only "suggests" the legally-appropriate breadth of the re-
straint; another factual inquiry in the form of a cost-benefit analysis is ap-
parently required, one that balances the costs of oppression to the covenant
or against a "corresponding benefit to the covenantee." This test does not
address the more common situation today, benefit to the covenantor and
oppression of the covenantee, and Taft's reference to the restraint tending
to a "monopoly" becomes, under today's law, an unnecessary attempt to
read Sherman Act section 2 into section 1 of the Sherman Act.92
Thomas Arthur reformulates Taft's tests as the centerpiece of his anal-
ysis: "[n]aked restraints are those which only restrict output, while ancil-
lary restraints promote wealth-creating voluntary exchanges and facilitate
joint productive activities."9 This reformulation makes Taft into a prophet
ployer ....
Id. at 281. Most contemporary antitrust cases revolve around very different restraints, re-
straints on the sale of goods or services falling into the following categories: information ex-
changes within trade associations, horizontal or vertical price fixing, horizontal or vertical ter-
ritorial or customer divisions, boycotts, tie-ins, and requirements and exclusive-dealing
contracts. These categories are not dealt with as such by Taft. But see also id. at 293, quoted
supra at note 88.
91. See supra note 46. It is, indeed, a too-broad rule of reason inquiry which provoked
Taft's worries about courts setting "sail on a sea of doubt, . . . [through] the power to say
...how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is not." Addys-
ton, 85 F. at 284. See Arthur, supra note I, at 298, 342. Fortunately, the Court has applied a
narrower rule of reason in several recent cases, see infra note 95.
92. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). For the text of Section 1, see supra note 82.
Early cases interpreted section 2 as a mere supplement to section 1. See, e.g., Standard
Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). But ever since United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), section 2 has been an independent basis for
antitrust liability; a section I-type restraint of trade need not be proved. See United States v.
United Shoe Mach., Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
For an example of a court struggling to discover the "main purpose" of a restraint, strug-
gling in ways which echo form versus substance inquiries in tax law matters, see Purchasing
Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963).
93. Arthur, supra note 1, at 301. This quote continues as follows: "The only question of
degree in this inquiry is whether the challenged restraint is reasonably related to the produc-
tive business transaction to which it is ancillary." Id. "Market power issues arise only in those
rare cases where an ancillary restraint may have given the defendants monopoly power." Id. at
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for the Chicago School of law and economics, whose adherents would pro-
hibit only those restraints of trade that restrict output. Such restraints
should be prohibited because they are "inefficient" or, as Arthur prefers to
call them, naked. All other restraints, ancillary restraints for Arthur, would
be permitted because they maximize consumer welfare in the eyes of Chi-
cagoans and of Arthur. Consumers would not necessarily pay less or receive
goods and services of higher quality; the wealth maximized through these
restraints will often be that of producers, and we are expected to remain
indifferent about how this wealth gets distributed.' But the distribution of
wealth among producers, and among producers, distributors, and consum-
ers, is as important a political concern in antitrust as it is under the tax
laws and under individual and corporate welfare programs.
Arthur's criterion would thus change the politics and the economics of
Sherman Act section 1 analyses substantially, but in purely legal terms, he
seems to be drawing a distinction without a difference. Arthur seeks to re-
place the well-grooved distinction between the per se rule and the rule of
reason with a distinction between naked and ancillary restraints. But the
court's finding of a naked or "manifestly anticompetitive" restraint is cur-
rently the basis for applying the per se rule, while the ancillarity of a re-
straint forces a court into a rule of reason analysis. 5 To this extent, Taft's
302. But these tests are as slippery as Taft's. See id. at 323, 340; supra notes 89-92; infra note
95 and accompanying text. For example, ancillary restraints aid "productive business transac-
tions," Arthur at 271, which leaves unanswered the question: Productive for whose benefit?
Taft would at least weigh the benefits against the oppression of the "covenantor." Addyston,
85 F. at 282. There is a slight and tangential basis in Addyston for Arthur's reformulation:
Taft observes in passing that some common law decisions enforce a restraint which is "only an
incident to the main purpose of a union of . . . capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a
successful business, and one useful to the community." Id. at 280. Arthur here follows a time-
honored tradition among antitrust commentators, of adding to or trimming older cases to ac-
commodate current preferences.
94. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 5; Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH.
L. Rv. 1696 (1986); Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984) [here-
inafter Easterbrook, Limits]. See also infra notes 130, 173 and accompanying text. Producers'
and consumers' interests often conflict, and the economically-rational producer will impose a
restraint which maximizes his wealth rather than the consumer's.
95. Arthur, supra note 1, at 271. Arthur would replace "today's per se rules, with their
talismanic emphasis on the specific form of a restraint, with a unitary per se rule against
naked restraints of all vareties." Id. at 341. But this would arguably do little more than shift
the "talismanic emphasis" to the question of whether a restraint is naked or ancillary. See
supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Arthur is properly concerned that antitrust courts
will deal with a good faith business planning punitively and after the fact. Arthur, supra note
1, at 344. But he does not detail how his naked/ancillary standard would reduce this tendency
markedly, and he ignores the (limited) credence courts do give to good faith attempts to com-
ply with the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See
also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 367 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting), which
arguably acquires greater force after Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (narrowing the applicability of the Silver majority's
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tests have already been incorporated by an antitrust law that has had to
develop further since 1898.96
By inquiring into legislative history, Arthur tries to attribute his read-
ing of Taft's intentions to the Congress of 1890.11 In the many examina-
tions of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, each examiner comes up
with a slightly or markedly different congressional intent. 8 These efforts
suffer from the defects of inquiries into the "original intent" of the Consti-
tution's framers. Isolated quotations from one senator or another will sup-
port almost any intention concerning antitrust. Like the "original intent"
underlying the Constitution, the legislative history of the Sherman Act be-
comes a kind of Rorschach Test; the meaning each examiner projects into
ambiguous material is more interesting than the material itself.
Like most other legislative historians, Thomas Arthur ignores the fact
that the Sherman Act was not passed by the self-confident Congress of re-
cent years but by legislators making a "relatively limited and unskillful use
of their endowments." 99 Their faith in markets shaken, the congressmen
opinion).
Arthur seems to be even more worried about a too-broad rule of reason. See supra notes
52, 91. Fortunately, the Court has applied a narrower or "mini" rule of reason in several
recent cases. This narrower rule arguably eliminates almost all differences of analysis or result
which might arise between applications of the per se/rule of reason distinction and of the
naked/ancillary restraint distinction. In these cases, the Court takes a "quick look" under the
rule of reason, to see if the restraint is naked or, what amounts to the same thing, "manifestly
anticompetitive." If the restraint is deemed naked, the per se rule applies; this rule is thus
applied more flexibly. If the restraint is not naked, the Court pursues a more elaborate rule of
reason inquiry. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Ari-
zona v. Maricopa Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979).
96. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
97. Arthur, supra note 1, at 277, 279-92. Citing floor statements by Sen. Sherman, Ar-
thur concludes that "majority-view" common law decisions were "incorporated" into the Act,
that some senators concurred with Sherman, and that none objected to his reading. Id. at 280-
81 & nn.72-74. Judge Taft is then seen to have adopted this majority view, to come up with a
"truer version of the old law." Id. at 281 (quoting Thorelli). See supra notes 89-93 and accom-
panying text. But see infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
98. See the inquires into legislative history cited supra note 82, and in Arthur, supra
note 1, at 273 n.29; I E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 125-242 (1980); W. LETWIN,
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT (1965); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966); Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1136-46 (1985); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82-106
(1982). Other similar studies include: H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGI-
NATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1954); A. WALKER, supra note 51. See also R. DICK-
ERSON, supra note 83, at 242: courts should not speculate about what the original legislature
would have done or about what the current legislature might do.
99. J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 10 (general characterization
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who passed the Sherman Act faced great and urgent popular demands with
no legislative or executive branch staffers to fall back on, and with no "ex-
pert" testimony to point the way. When the Sherman Act was passed there
was vitually no relevant legal or economic expertise to draw upon. Congress
was worried that the Court would later construe anything it might do as
impairing private obligations or as exceeding congressional powers under a
Commerce Clause that was then interpreted narrowly. The Sherman Act
was thus a stab in the dark, and the last thing congressmen wanted was for
a court to lob the antitrust ball back to them.' 00 But this is exactly what the
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States'' Court did in 1911, and
Congress feared that the courts would use Standard Oil's confused extrapo-
lations from Taft's Addyston opinion to condone many restraints of trade.
The Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts0 2 were thus introduced
in 1914 as counterweights to judicial interpretation. William Howard Taft
reacted by writing a book which argued, in effect, that this legislation was
unnecessary because his Addyston criteria were adequate to the situa-
tion.'03 Congress considered this argument and rejected it by enacting the
new legislation.
of Congress at about that time).
100. Id. at 11, 16; C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 45, at 58-59. See J. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES, supra note 46, at 12 (at the time, Congress "lacked the resources of tradition,
experience, or operating skill to meet the demand"). But see also Arthur, supra note 1, at 332.
During the 1890 Sherman Act debates, concrete questions asked on the floor of Congress were
evaded through general answers that merely tracked the statutory language. I P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 7, § 106, at 14. The revolutionary effects of the Sherman Act were not
foreseen by the 1890 Congress. Some doubted the need for it, given a limited success in curb-
ing the trusts through cases like State ex rel. Attorney General v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio
St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892), and People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24
N.E. 834 (1890). Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 219, 219 nn.17-18. See id. at 221 n.23 (quoting
2 C. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 341 (n.d.): "[O]n the open confession of
those who passed it," the Sherman Act "was nebulous of meaning and for ten years practically
nothing worthy of note was done under its prohibitions"). But see United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In Addyston, 85 F. at
296-301, Taft was at pains to distinguish the facts from those in the Court's first Sherman Act
decision, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Knight held that the then-
narrow commerce clause powers of Congress did not extend to restraints on manufacture, as
distinct from those on interstate transport. id.
Arthur does admit that Congress can at most "make basic policy choices for courts to
apply in good faith to individual cases." Arthur, supra note 1, at 276. See also id. at 290
n.124 and accompanying text, citing 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890) (which quotes Sen. Sherman
for a similar proposition). Arthur's admission describes what more or less happened subse-
quently. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. Antitrust is the "outstanding exam-
ple" of Congress, and others, using courts to develop the content and extend the range of
official policy. A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at 321, 326.
101. 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1982) respectively.
103. See W. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914).
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Many jurists would permit only the narrowest use of legislative history.
There is a "danger of inventing fictitious and fanciful legislative purposes,"
through a "bootstrap operation of formulating 'legislative purpose' with one
eye on the situation to which it is to be applied." '' Judge Bork arguably
falls into this trap when he attributes the single Chicago School goal of
maximizing consumer welfare to the 1890 Congress that promulgated the
Sherman Act.1"' Unlike Arthur or Bork, Areeda and Turner "concur with
what we perceive to be the main thrust of the case law." Inexplicit statutes
and an unilluminating legislative history do not "compel or even strongly
suggest a different course of antitrust interpretation."' 106 As in constitu-
tional interpretation, a broader "history of the times" offers a more reliable
basis for construing the Sherman Act:
Basically, the protest and revolt were against every movement
and tendency to concentrate economic power in monopolistic en-
terprises to the extent that any combination could restrict pro-
duction [Arthur's and the Chicago School's sole concern], fix
104. R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 93-94. See also NBO Indus. Treadway Co., v.
Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 279 (3d Cir. 1975), quoted supra at note 51; R. DICKERSON,
supra note 83, at 164 (a Canadian jurist gibes that Americans are permitted to refer to the
statute where the legislative history is ambiguous); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES,
supra note 46, at 34, 54 (English judges altogether reject evidence of legislative history as
incompetent and unreliable). See generally M. RADIN, ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HIS-
TORY § 192 (1936) (discussing conflict between common law and statutory law).
Justice Jackson expands on the dangers of relying on legislative history in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) (considering the now-repealed
"fair trade law" exemption to Section 1 of the Sherman Act), quoted in R. DICKERSON, supra
note 83:
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescapably
ambiguous . . . . I cannot deny that I have sometimes offended against that rule. But to
select casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accu-
racy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to
substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions. . . . Moreover, it
is only the words of the bill that have presidential approval, where that approval is
given . ..
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the
meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for all of our people
to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their rights under those laws are.
Here is a controversy which affects every little merchant in many States. Aside from a
few offices in the larger cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the
lawyer who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of
repeatedly examining the whole congressional history ...
By and large, I think our function was well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "We do
not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."
105. See R. BORK, supra note 5, at 61-66, 82-84; Arthur, supra note 1, at 319 (quoting
R. BORK, supra note 5, at 61, and criticizing his Chicago School view as justifying "virtually
any exercise of judicial power").
106. I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 7, §§ 105-106. A court may attribute the
result to congressional intent as a substitute for thought and analysis.
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prices, crush opposition, favor the few to the detriment of the
many, corrupt public officials and produce immense quantities of
wealth for the few . . .
B. Addyston as Water Under the Bridge
Judge Taft all but ignored this history of the times, a history which
should have been fresh in his mind, when he interpreted the Sherman Act
as a mere supplement to the remedies of a restated common law. Industrial
and transport trusts were busy arrogating privileges and destroying rights,
in ways clearly inconsistent with the purposes of trusts under a common law
which had failed. But Taft was more worried about the fate of a private
common law which, he felt, could still be perfected. He worried that the
nascent public law of the Sherman Act would, under successors to Trans-
Missouri, be used to solve the problem of the trusts in ways that destroyed
the older common law. Addyston thus reads as if Taft had applied the then-
popular canon of construction that statutes in derogation of the common
law shall be strictly (narrowly) construed. This canon was rejected when
antitrust began to be constitutionalized, rejected because it came from a
nineteenth century judicial source hostile to the legislative process. 08 The
107. Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 241. See also id. at 217, 222, 228-30; J. HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 51 (the history of the times was considered by
judicial notice in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)). See
also supra note 83 and accompanying text. Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 224-25 nn.38-50,
cites United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (1951), Standard Oil v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951), United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 553 (1944),
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1910), and Trans-Missouri, for the proposition that courts glean the antitrust history
of the times from "newsapers, magazine articles, historical works, biographies, general litera-
ture, law review articles, party platforms, debates in Congress, testimony offered before com-
mittees in Congress, . . . messages of the President to Congress, statements made by a distin-
guished judge before a bar association and judicial conference, and a wide variety of otherwise
historical material." Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 224-25. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 7, § 107, at 17, defines the goal of antitrust as the efficient pursuit of marketplace de-
mands and "also those expressed collectively through laws, social conventions, and government
purchases, subsidies, and taxes." But see also Arthur, supra note 1, at 284-85.
108. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (Jackson, J.);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-80, 283-87 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 64 n.79; Arthur,
supra note 1, at 290 (admitting that, where the "common law failed to provide operational
legal rules," the courts had to "develop" such rules to implement basic congressional policies);
Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41, 50 (1937); Limbaugh, supra
note 46, at 242-43; supra note 83 and accompanying text.
The rule or presumption that a statute in derogation of the common law is not intended to
change the common law sometimes limits legislative power, and sometimes veils "unacknowl-
edged value preferences which may not stand close examination." J. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES, supra note 46, at 64. Judge Taft may have been using this canon in an attempt to
save the Sherman Act from an unconstitutional vagueness - an irrelevant issue today. See
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"common law" of antitrust continued to evolve through the infusion of a
public law, and the Addyston criteria were finally found to be insufficiently
rich in the implications needed to deal with complex new issues.
The terms of an ideological debate begun by Justice Peckham and
Judge Taft in 1897-98109 are still being fleshed out today. The debate is
ideological in the sense that it concerns what antitrust law "ought" to be,
with almost no pure facts for guidance. Positivist attempts to describe only
the "is" of an antitrust law preoccupied with so hotly-contested an "ought"
could only lead to confusion. Edward Purcell, Jr. sets this confusion in a
broader historical context:
The tendency to see the actual ["is"] as the good ["ought"] gen-
erated the profoundly ideological character of American politics
... . Americans never abandoned the [Jeffersonian] demo-
cratic ideal, and hence conflict continually erupted. Since the
ideal remained, and since there were always some who dissented,
the actuality was frequently attacked in the name of the
ideal. . . . [O]pponents were continually led to idealize the exis-
tent. . . . [W]hen the ideal was juxtaposed to the reality, the
existent appeared sadly lacking. 110
Addyston, 85 F. at 295-98; See also J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at
63.
Taft admits that the "disposition to use every means to reduce competition and create
monopolies has grown so much of late" that the focus of the common law should change.
Addyston, 85 F. at 280. Yet he develops his criteria from cases in five traditional categories
which do not speak to this tendency. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. Taft
contends that the original strictures of the common law have not been relaxed "as conditions
of civilization and public policy have changed." Such a conclusion is "unwarranted by the
authorities when all of them are considered." Addyston, 85 F. at 283. But Taft cites and seeks
to minimize many of the English and American case decisions which do support this conclu-
sion. See id. at 282-86. For example, the leading case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt
Guns and Ammunition Co., 1894 App. Cas. 535, 567 (discussed at length in Addyston, 85 F.
at 282-83), enforced a worldwide 25-year restraint on the production of armaments. A more
general and naked restraint is difficult to imagine. The case law shows that English and Amer-
ican courts only sporadically curbed the exercise of private economic power, under the assump-
tion that the resolution of private disputes adequately vindicated the public interest. See
Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 242-43.
For Taft, the main purpose of the Sherman Act was to enhance remedies; restraints "at
common law were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal or giving rise to a civil action for
damages." Addyston, 85 F. at 279. But see, e.g., King v. Norris, 96 Eng. Rep. 1189 (K.B.
1758) (a price fixing agreement concerning salt can support a criminal conviction); Anon.-
Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fo. 5, pl. 26 (1415) (restraint on employment held void at com-
mon law, "and per Dieu, if the plaintiff Were here, he should go to prison till he paid a fine to
the king"). See also Arthur, supra note 1, at 284 (a federal antitrust solution is needed be-
cause of limitations on state courts' jurisdiction and state enforcement resources - points that
Taft did not make).
109. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
110. E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND
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Having tried to idealize the law existing prior to the Sherman Act, Taft
could not win the ideological debate easily; his common law criteria often
"appeared sadly lacking" to courts going through successive stages in anti-
trust analysis.
With slight alterations in the dates, the four intellectual "tides" G.
Edward White describes in Tort Law in America help us to plot the drift
away from Addyston in antitrust. These overlapping stages or fashions in
legal analysis are: a Langdellian formalism, 1800-1910 (1880-1920 and af-
ter for antitrust); legal realism, 1910-1945 (about 1920-1940, an interreg-
num for antitrust); consensus legal thought, 1945-1970 (the late New Deal
consensus over the activist enforcement of antitrust law, 1940-1975); and a
neo-formalism thereafter."' These theories of adjudication lag behind the
intellectual currents fashionable elsewhere in society, probably because
judges come to the bench late in life and trace their formative influences
back to an earlier intellectual era. For example, Louis Brandeis' ideas find
their fullest expression in opinions written by Justice Douglas thirty to fifty
years later," 2 and turn-of-the-century Progressivism finds its vindication in
the influences of Chief Justice Warren." 3 Born too late to have been
greatly influenced by Progressivism and the formative stages of legal real-
ism, the younger members of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts remain
open to the seductively synthetic powers of a neo-formalism in law and in
Chicago School economics.
White's first stage, Langdellian legal science, 1880 to 1920 and beyond
for antitrust, is an extrapolation from the common law tradition of formal-
ism that empowered Judge Taft as it had his English brethren. Harvard's
Langdell taught that abstract general principles could be used to resolve
concrete disputes in a scientific way. Words and concepts have a concrete
meaning that can be rationally developed and elaborated under clear rules
of logic and precedent acceptable to all." 4 This is the mechanical jurispru-
dence Judge Taft used: put antitrust or any other facts in the hopper, turn
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 271 (1973).
111. Fleming, Book Review, 1980 AMERICA B. FOUND. RES. J. 614, 615 (review of G.
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980)).
112. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 538-44 (1973); SEC v.
Medical Community for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407-11 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315-21 (1949) (Douglas J.,
dissenting); United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 534-40 (1948) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting), quoted in part, supra text accompanying note 31.
113. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 414-26 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); G.
WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 294-302 (1982).
114. R. UNGER, supra note 47, at 93-94; Klare, supra note 18, at 277-78 (discussing a
"conceptualist formalism," 1885-1930); Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial
Bureaucracy in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1469, 1472-77 (1983).
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the crank, and out pops the correct result. He seemed to find rather than
make an antitrust law, through a process which homologized that which is
to be with that which has always been under the common law, changing as
little as possible. Attempts by Congress in 1890 and 1914 to make genu-
inely new antitrust laws were thus met with uncharitably narrow judicial
interpretation like Taft's. Antitrust statutes were seen to infringe a common
law judge's conceptual and political power, and thus to endanger a tradi-
tional separation of powers. 1' 5
This seemingly benign positivism was met head-on by Populism,
Progressivsm, and the intellectual forces of modernism. The import of these
movements escaped the many judges who later refused to give credence to
the intellectual history of their times: "Stravinsky, Picasso, Joyce, Einstein,
and Freud each radically challenged the effort to structure reality into a
single, determinate, rationalizable order. . . . [Elach inaugurated a search
for a new kind of order consistent with their attack upon the simpler con-
ception of rationality held by their predecessors . . . ."I" In law, the chal-
lenge and search came to be called legal realism. A simpler common law
conception of rationality like Taft's was seen to be manifestly inadequate.
Common law values and the meaning of phrases like "naked restraint" and
the "main purpose" of a contract were deemed totally subjective. Results
under a common law conception then became indeterminate, except as they
can be predicted from a particular judge's disposition. Unable to set limits
on the revolt against the rigidities of formalism, legal realism became like
other modernisms, a reign of terror against precision, logic, and analytical
methods. 1 '
A mostly older and conservative group of Supreme Court justices did
not take kindly to these tenets. The liberals, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone,
reflected some tenets of legal realism and the related but milder "sociologi-
115. By late in the nineteenth century, the growth of the common law had captured the
ambitions and imaginations of judges and academics. It was "the true law compared with
which legislation was marginal, exceptional, and indeed intrusive." J. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES, supra note 46, at 41-42. The "capricious and sporadic method" of statutes was seen
to infuse "illegitimate principles into an otherwise symmetrical jurisprudence." Horack, supra
note 108, at 41. Professionally-trained judges were deemed safer guardians of the law than a
legislature "because they develop a cautious appreciation of the necessities of certainty and
continuity." Id. at 50. Arthur pursues these necessities in a Langdellian, positivist way, while
denying that courts have the authority to impose social and political goals in the guise of
construing statutes. Arthur, supra note 1, at 333. Yet this is arguably just what Taft did in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
116. Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 125 (1974).
117. R. UNGER, supra note 47, at 93-94. Legal realism undermined the view that law
was made "pursuant to the positivist's closed model of deductive logic .... [Realism dis-
turbed] this tidy world of clipped analysis and gentlemanly dispute, heavily laden with foot-
notes." Flynn, supra note 4, at 1184.
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cal" jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound and others in their opinions. But except
for Brandeis, " 8 these tendencies were rather muted in the liberals' ap-
proach to antitrust. Holmes, the Court's leading legal realist at the time,
did not believe in the antitrust enterprise and adopted a surprisingly formal-
istic approach to it." 9 It is thus difficult to trace the influences of legal
realism, such as G. Edward White's second tide, on antitrust, except to note
the Court's growing uncertainty. This uncertainty seemed to stem from a
realization that formalism and its underlying conservativism were inade-
quate for dealing with new restraints of trade, restraints limited only by the
imaginations of highly-paid lawyers and corporate managers. The best evi-
dence of this uncertainty is Appalachian'20 in which Chief Justice Hughes,
a moderate conservative, repudiated Taft's common law approach by inau-
gurating the constitutionalization of antitrust. He was uncertain, however,
about how to apply this insight to the Appalachian facts, and he wound up
writing a rather formalistic opinion. 2 '
Formalism retained a significant influence over antitrust until Justice
Douglas' landmark United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.' 2 decision in
1940. The Depression and the New Deal had by then furnished justifica-
tions for putting a revolt against formalism into practice, through what
Robert Summers calls a "pragmatic instrumentalism.' 23 Summers' is an
adroit characterization because it suggests a positive program rather than
the nihilism of a legal realism. Yet the legal theory of the time gave judges
no guidance over what they were to be pragmatic about or instrumental for.
Judges were thus receptive to new ideological blandishments about antitrust
to replace Taft's conservative tenets that were widely considered to have
failed during the Depression. Thurmond Arnold and his successors at the
118. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 377, 413-19
(1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
119. See National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923);
1 0. HOLMES, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 163 (1941) (Holmes, on Apr. 23, 1910) ("I don't
disguise my belief that the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and
incompetence").
120. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
121. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. It was as if Hughes, C.J., was learn-
ing something from realists like Jerome Frank. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 25, 25
n.50, 238.
122. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In Socony, Douglas created the modern per se rule of anti-
trust liability that was hinted at in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927) (Stone, J.) (an opinion with a trace of legal realism about it); and originally in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896). See supra note 83 and accompa-
nying text.
123. R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). See So-
cony, 310 U.S. 150; R. UNGER, supra note 47, at 96 (instrumental rationality judgments can-
not pretend to create generality, stability or a coherent theory of adjudication, and judges thus
make legislative and administrative judgments which undermine a traditional separation of
powers); infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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Justice Department and at the Federal Trade Commission eagerly provided
new cajolery about an administrative expertise at detecting antitrust
violations.124
The Court's 1937 discovery that property rights need not be funda-
mental 25 had as marked an effect on antitrust as on constitutional law.
This discovery enabled the Court to homologize longstanding antitrust stat-
utes with a broader constitutional and administrative law, rather than with
the private common law of Addyston that protected property rights too
zealously to serve as a vehicle for reform. The opportunities for reform were
provided by an explosion of cases reaching courts from new administrative
agencies or, in the case of antitrust, from bureaucracies reinvigorated late
in the New Deal. Justices Douglas and Black approached antitrust cases in
the same way as they approached constitutional cases, by refusing to tie
liberals' hands with Justice Frankfurter's notions of a judicial self-restraint.
The influence of big business and of conservative antitrust precedents had
to be undone, and this was accomplished through an activism rather plausi-
bly portrayed as a deference to the congressional will of thirty to eighty
years earlier. To do this, Douglas and Black had to reject the Addyston
common law model of case-by-case interstitial lawmaking, which depends
upon the initiative and means of private litigants for sporadic vindications
of the public interest. The Court adopted a constitutional style of poli-
cymaking for antitrust instead, and extended its opinions far beyond the
ambit of the facts in cases that are the ostensible reasons for the exercise.
Such policymaking frankly incorporated the legal realist insight that the
interpretation of antitrust and other statutes is inescapably a kind of legis-
lation by courts and by agencies like the FTC. 2
The consensus policy of an activist enforcement of antitrust, corre-
sponding to G. Edward White's third tide, lasted until about 1975. This
policy was part of a liberal legal vision, an ever-unfolding status quo of
more of the same from the Court. Through a "reasoned elaboration," judi-
124. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra note 144 and accompanying text.
125. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); NLRB v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
126. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (Justice White's argu-
ment that judicial activism in antitrust is justified by the fact that Congress can change the
results if it does not like them), quoted infra at text accompanying note 162; J. HURST, DEAL-
ING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at I I (courts allocate "responsibility for social processes
between market processes and legal processes"); id. at 25-28; R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at
238; Arthur, supra note 1, at 308-09 (Roosevelt's Court appointees rejected the Appalachian
Coals permissiveness towards cartels while retaining its constitutional approach to antitrust);
Klare, supra note 18, at 268, 275-77; id. at 270 (discussing a "social conceptualism" which
seems similar to White's consensus legal thought and to Summers' pragmatic instrumental-
ism); infra notes 151, 157 and accompanying text. But see Arthur, supra note 1, at 330 (citing
21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) which quotes Sen. Sherman).
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cial statements of antitrust law gradually became more sweeping, dogmatic,
and impossible to reconcile with cases like Addyston, which were decided
during an earlier stage of judicial analysis.2 7 Discussing a 1941 labor law
decision, Karl Klare could also be describing the hodge-podge found in
many post-World War II antitrust and constitutional law opinions when he
wrote:
Phelps Dodge contained a chaotic amalgam of conceptualism
and realism, ruleboundedness and ad hoc balancing, deference
to nonjudicial sources of law and unhesitating faith in the supe-
riority of the judicial mind. This jurisprudential melange tran-
scended political lines and attitudes as to whether the proper
judicial role is one of activism or restraint. I believe that all of
modern legal consciousness partakes of this hodge-podge
character."2 8
The consensus over the further elaboration of this hodge-podge in anti-
trust - a consensus which had kept the concepts fluid since 1940 - began
to collapse around 1975, after the retirement of Justices Black and Douglas.
What followed was a rather confused neo-formalism, G. Edward White's
fourth tide of neo-conceptualism. This neo-formalism amounts to a con-
servative self-restraint by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. These Courts
have retained much of the activist antitrust doctrines of the Warren Court,
recently by narrow majorities.
The liberal activism of Justices Black and Douglas in antitrust can be
undone only by a countervailing conservative activism, consistently exerted
by a Court majority that does not yet exist. Beginning in the mid-1970s,
academics widely criticized the accumulation of antitrust contradictions,
which were frequently no more than Black's or Douglas' hunches. These
academic criticisms were given further impetus by a confused Burger Court
that was not self-confident, that was unable to replace Warren Court prece-
dents with something better or as good. The Burger Court was somewhat
more willing to listen to business' justifications for its conduct, and some-
what less willing to defer to the expertise of government officials. This
Court seemingly adopted whichever argument sounded more sophisticated
for the moment and changed the law as little as possible.' 29
127. See L. BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS 49 (1978); R. BORK,
supra note 5, at 15 (knowing too little economics, the Court made its job almost impossible by
adopting an "undiscriminating and unreflective activism" based on judgments about which
interest groups should be helped); Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community -
American Style, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 900, 913 (1984-85); White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
128. Klare, supra note 18, at 334 (discussing Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941)).
129. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Jeffer-
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The revolt against formalism having more or less exhausted formalism
as well as itself, we seem to be cycling back toward a neo-formalism. Posi-
tivist calls for a legal regularity in antitrust, including calls, such as Ar-
thur's, for the interstitial, case-by-case lawmaking of a common law formal-
ism, are reinforced by the creative scholarship of a closed system, by the
comprehensive, abstract, and relentless methodology of Chicago School eco-
nomics. Academic synthesis is preceding judicial innovation as it did during
the New Deal, and Chicagoans have won a few impressive victories in the
Supreme Court.130 But Chicagoans face what may be called a growing re-
volt against neo-formalism; Critical Legal Studies followers deconstruct
Chicago School doctrines, and economists and legal philosophers point out
the Chicago School's ethical, logical, and factual errors. So far, Chicagoans
have held their ground through rapid and effective reformulations, but these
efforts have slowed the pace of their expansionist enterprise and have re-
pelled judges who are looking for simple solutions. The cyclical nature of
antitrust - a common law consensus succeeded by a constitutional one,
with periods of self-doubt sandwiched in between - suggests the likely out-
come of these debates: the Chicago Schools' critics will go on to found a
full-blown neorealism, and this will be followed by a new consensus policy
for antitrust.
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979). But see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (arguably a decision restricted
so narrowly to its facts as to be of slight precedental value).
130. See G. WHITE, supra note 11, at 209-12; Arthur, supra note 1, at 375; Flynn,
supra note 4, at 1185 (the Chicago School amounts to positivism reborn, requiring only a
"collective bending at the knee by bench and bar before the 'science' of economics"); Nonet,
Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CAL. L. REV. 263, 294 (1980).
The list of Chicago School antitrust victories in the Supreme Court is short: Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (roughly, a conspiracy to violate
the antitrust laws cannot exist when it does not make good economic sense for the parties to
conspire in that fashion); GTE, 433 U.S. 36 (the rule of reason rather than the per se rule
applies to vertical - manufacturer to dealer - customer and territorial allocations, because
such restrictions often have procompetitive advantages). See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (a partial victory, when some Chicago School dicta
from Judge Bork get homologized with the consensus view of monopolization). See also United
States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (in a case which seems narrowly restricted
to its facts, the Court requires more analytical rigor in market definitions, a tendency the
Chicago School subsequently applauded). But the Court rejected as improvident a Chicago
School-inspired invitation to turn the per se rule concerning vertical price fixing into a rule of
reason: Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). In Jefferson Parish,
a Chicago School-inspired analysis of tying and/or exclusive dealing contracts failed by a 5-4
vote. In some other decisions which seem to be narrowly restricted to their facts, the Court's
confused departures from previous law seemingly owe little or nothing to Chicago School anal-
ysis. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); infra note 152 and accompanying
text.
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The Reagan counterrevolution is thus unlikely to result in permanent
changes in antitrust. This counterrevolution involves the lax enforcement of
antitrust and other statutes, without a congressional consensus for disman-
tling most statutory bases for regulatory power. No politician wants to risk
his career by explicitly repealing fundamental values such as those ex-
pressed by the economic "Magna Carta" that is antitrust. 31 So long as the
statutory bases remain in place for antitrust, the bureaucratic will to power
is going to reassert itself through an activist enforcement - when Rea-
ganite administrators are no longer around to repress it. Many of Reagan's
judicial appointees will then have to turn against a laxity that has no legal
basis, unless the Chicago School can come up with a more elegant rationale
for doing nothing. Addyston is not such a rationale. It is a brilliant period
piece, brilliantly defended by Thomas Arthur, but as Thomas Wolfe
proved, you can't go home again. 182 Too many political, economic, and doc-
trinal insights lie between Addyston and the firmly constitutionalized anti-
trust of today.
V. UNCERTAINTY IN ANTITRUST
Uncertainty in antitrust is manifest and extreme. Although antitrust
frequently seems on the verge of a breakthrough, it always relapses into
confusion. Piecemeal extensions and contractions in antitrust and other gov-
ernmental economic interventions reflect both a political opportunism and
changing perceptions of what improves the performance of business. The
outcomes of intervention illustrate a failure to deal with emerging problems
promptly and efficiently - a private sector often outrunning the will and
capacity of the public sector to supervise it under statutory mandates. Anti-
trust policies become more technical and more complex in the process, and
hence more confusing and boring for all but the cognoscenti.
There are many reasons for the uncertainty of antitrust. Much of the
uncertainty is inevitable, and little of it can be specifically attributed to
what Thomas Arthur describes as a constitutionalization: the judges' con-
version of the Sherman Act into a standardless delegation of power to
themselves, a result of their failure to make Addyston"3 I the centerpiece of
antitrust analysis."" Addyston could not have prevented the significant un-
certainties discussed in section IV (B) above, those resulting from a hodge-
podge of different case decisions from different eras in antitrust analysis. In
131. See C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 45, at 77; supra notes 45, 57, 58 and accompanying
text.
132. See T. WOLFE, YOU CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN (1940).
133. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
134. Arthur, supra note 1, at 268, 272, 290, 375; supra notes 2, 3, 95 and accompanying
text. See also S. BURTON, supra note 48, at 165, 223; Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of
Uncertainty in the Concept of Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 195, 208 (1980).
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Standard Oil, the confused extrapolation from Addyston, Chief Justice
White found that "[bloth as to the law and as to the facts, the opposing
contentions pressed in the arguments are numerous, and . . . so irreconcila-
ble that it is difficult to reduce them to some fundamental generalization,
which, by being disposed of, would decide them all."' 35 Things have gone
from bad to worse on this front since 1911.
The "is" and "ought" of the Sherman Act and its judicial interpreta-
tions interacted in complex and sometimes surprising ways for nearly a cen-
tury. Throughout this time a residual uncertainty always remained, even if
the text and context of the Sherman Act were properly appraised and reap-
praised. This uncertainty can be resolved only through further legislation,
which has not been forthcoming, or through judicial lawmaking. The prece-
dents that result are the means to a task made no less essential by congres-
sional inaction - resolving disputes. These means are superior to resolving
disputes by flipping a coin, "if the court has first made an honest but unsuc-
cessful effort to balance the actual probabilities of [statutory] meaning and
not let mechanical application override the most probable result."' 6
Taft's Addyston criteria are as amenable to a formalist or neo-formal-
ist "mechanical application" as are any other antitrust criteria. Thomas Ar-
thur's Taftian approach would merely shift the focus of uncertainty from a
conventional per se rule/rule of reason distinction to the naked/ancillary
restraint distinction he espouses. Like the conventional distinction, Arthur's
turns on a characterization, a pigeonholing that can be simpleminded or
sophisticated in its application. Courts have not "set sail on a sea of doubt"
because of a constitutionalization of antitrust, as Arthur alleges, but be-
cause they sometimes use a too-broad rule of reason - a danger Taft rec-
ognized and courts now seek to minimize. 37 The same danger would arise
from a too-broad category of ancillary restraints.
Hart and Sacks recommend that a "creative elaboration" be applied to
statutory interpretation "because a rational court and a rational legislature
would presumably apply the same basic standard: What best fits with the
135. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). Arthur argues that
Standard Oil placed a heavy emphasis on statutory construction, and it thus continued the
"traditional approach" begun in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1896). Arthur, supra note 1, at 298. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. I would add
that Standard Oil also continues the tradition of an ad hoc, fact-bound determination begun in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899). Like Taft's, Chief Justice White's "words ...are empty." Arthur, supra note 1, at
298, referring to White but not Taft. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. See also
Arthur, supra note 1, at 298, 303.
136. R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 229. See id. at 221; infra notes 147, 166 and
accompanying text.
137. See Addyston, 85 F. at 284; Arthur, supra note 1, at 272, 297-98, 342; supra notes
52, 79, 91, 95 and accompanying text. But see Arthur, supra note 1, at 301, 340.
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rest of the statutory and legal system?" '1 8 The problem is that, over the
long history of antitrust, elaborations of Addyston's and many other criteria
have been too numerous and sometimes too creative. Courts have tried all
conceivable combinations of criteria and found them wanting; the doctrinal
possibilities are more or less exhausted. Many lawyers, economists, judges,
and academics (Thomas Arthur excepted) do not try to resolve even the
most blatant contradictions in the materials of antitrust. They opt instead
for ever-more-subtle distinctions and a heightened scrutiny of rival analy-
ses. The complexity of antitrust generates much income for the many pro-
fessionals needed to deal with it, and complexity offers opportunities to cir-
cumvent antitrust rules or to profit from them in unexpected ways.
Thomas Arthur is sensitive to the extreme delays and expense that
forestall and jumble new antitrust initatives, and he mentions the periodic
attempts at procedural reforms.1 3 9 But Arthur's analyses play down two
other sources of uncertainty - failure to recognize diversity in congeries of
partly conflicting antitrust policies, and inflexibility. Antitrust law does not
adapt fast enough when socio-economic conditions change, as public and
private bureaucratization proceeds apace, and as business finds new ways to
circumvent the law. There are other reasons for the uncertainty of antitrust,
reasons Arthur does not claim to address. These are the uncertainties of a
political climate that changes rapidly and radically from time to time; of a
lack of information, expertise, and often a simple competence; and of the
widespread confusion of antitrust theories with events occurring in the real
world. The latter confusion was as widespread among Harvard School econ-
omists in the 1960s as it is among their Chicago School rivals today, al-
though formulae and graphs may give the deceptive appearance of precision
to their divergent attempts at analyzing the real world.
The most important source of uncertainty that seldom gets discussed is
that antitrust policy is made by a m6nage d trois. Governmental and busi-
ness plaintiffs consistently put forth their Jeffersonian arguments, business
defendants reflexively adopt Hamiltonian responses, and judges try to re-
flect Madisonian and other interests. These actors form a triangle, perhaps
a juristic version of Michel's "iron triangle." 40 This relationship, stable in
138. R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 244 (citing Hart and Sacks).
139. Arthur, supra note 1, at 323, discussing the 1979 Report of President Carter's
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.
140. Michels described an "iron law of oligarchy": democracy varies inversely with or-
ganization. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 85 (1976). Some see as a corollary to this law
an anti-democratic "triangle": an interest group, a legislative committee, and an agency get
together to make rules in their mutual interest and at the expense of the public interest. Amer-
ican experience shows that law and economic activity are joint products of groups from the
private and public sectors. See Reiter & Hughes, A Preface on Modelling the Regulated
United States Economy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1381 (1981); supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
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geometry but extremely unstable in human affairs, is inherently incapable
of creating a consistent flow of antitrust results and doctrine. The intense
ideological competitions that result should not surprise us, since high-stakes
competitions are supposedly what antitrust is all about. These competitions
legitimate the "big case" in antitrust, although Arthur attributes its legiti-
mation to Chicago Board of Trade v. United States. 4
Antitrust cases are regular parts of the constant ebb and flow of
threats and benefits between corporations and government agencies. De-
fendants emphasize business benefits and agency threats, and government
plaintiffs emphasize agency benefits and business threats. "2 Plaintiff and
defendant are always pushing as hard as they can in opposite directions, so
that antitrust law comes to turn on exaggerated oppositions between pairs.
These pairs are variations on the plaintiff versus defendant theme: antitrust
"hawks" versus "doves," Harvard School versus Chicago School, per se rule
versus rule of reason. Thomas Arthur does not explain why his rejuvenated
naked versus ancillary restraint distinction would be an improvement, why
it would not quickly become another false dichotomy. (The dichotomies of
antitrust are false because business behavior is alternately good, bad, and
indifferent, depending on what is done, who evaluates it, and the criteria
(s)he selects.)
Antitrust plaintiffs will cleverly assert their expertise at detecting the
badness in anything like bigness, or in acting big by getting together to
restrain trade. Anything so inherently bad must be adjudged illegal "as
such," per se, under a "devil" theory of antitrust. Defendants will creatively
argue that unfettered business activity is such a good thing that the court
must listen carefully to, and approve under a rule of reason, long-winded
justifications for behavior alleged to violate the antitrust laws. What is a
poor court to do, when each rival will do his utmost to make his definition
of the problem and the solution "stick?" Sometimes the court falls back on
intuition to reach an unclear decision which seeks to balance the parties and
their arguments, in a caricature of the process Madison had in mind. The
public interest is served to a limited extent by the fact that plaintiffs' and
defendants' self-interested blandishments must be fitted into a third judicial
ideology, to form an attractive picture of how markets should function
under law.
As in constitutional law, the judicial approach to antitrust is largely an
ideology of process, of maintaining the procedures and remedies through
which the parties' values and interests can be expressed and pressed. Al-
141. Arthur, supra note 1, at 303-04, citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918).
142. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 1, 14 (1964).
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though Thomas Arthur disputes the point,' 4" this emphasis on process val-
ues affords the public some protection against a judge who seeks to imple-
ment personal policy preferences. Unfortunately, this public benefit is more
than offset by the costs to the public of leaving the judicial ideology depen-
dent upon the parties' cajolery for its substance. Only "rarely and perhaps
fortuitously may an [antitrust] opinion be expected to rise above its source
in the presentations of counsel."144 Many will think that exceptions to this
rule lack moral force and guidance, as, e.g., obiter dicta, in an adversarial
system of justice.
The rules of the game compel judges, and thus the parties and their
lawyers and economists, to prove that frequently confused and confusing
case decisions offer successively better approximations of an ideal rational-
ity. Past and present case decisions absorb ideology, fads, and new nuances
in the way political novels do, through attempts to show the relationship
between theory and experience over time. Judge Wyzanski puts a brave
face on this process: "champions of the anti-trust laws" frequently see only
"judicial timidity" and an "economic innocence." But courts "would not
have been given, or allowed to keep" so much power over antitrust, "and
they would not so freely have altered from time to time the interpretation of
its substantive provisions, if courts" had proceeded with "surgical ruthless-
ness" to the "immediate realization of the social, political, and economic
advantages of dispersal of power. 1 4 5
This moderation and an uncertainty in antitrust can lead a judge to
143. See Arthur, supra note 1, at 304, 308, 310, 326.
144. M. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 132
(1964) (quoting Judge Clark). See Brigham, Judicial Impact Upon Social Practices: A Per-
spective on Ideology, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 47, 51 (1985); Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 94, at
10 (by taking the parties' positions as givens, the judge forfeits the opportunity to create gains
by formulating the best rule to apply to future situations); Feinman, Book Review, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 722, 728 (1980); supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
Discussing the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873), Louis Lusky notes:
"The Court split five to four .... No one spoke for a third viev, probably for the understand-
able (if inadequate) reason that neither of the opposing set of litigants would have been aided
by it .... " J. ELY, supra note 47, at 22-23 (quoting Lusky). Ely sees a useful "middle
ground between the chaos . . . complainants were inviting and the tautology to which the
Court seems to have ended up lashing itself." Id. at 23.
145. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
LAW AND JUSTICE 440 (1966) (uncertainty in antitrust includes uncertainty about the applica-
bility and range of an economic theory); Arnold, The Emperor's Old Clothes: The Folklore of
Capitalism Revisited, 52 YALE L.J. 188, 194 (1962); Arthur, supra note I, at 309-11 (anti-
trust judges feel that they must play the inconsistent roles of a passive applier of settled prece-
dents, economic regulatory commissioner, and activist lawgiver); Easterbrook, Limits, supra
note 94, at 75; supra notes 73-75, 78 and accompanying text. These views are rejected by the
arguably simplistic attitudes of Justices Clark and McReynolds, see infra notes 149-50 and
accompanying text.
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search for an intent to harm or for conduct of the "smoking gun" variety
where the statute does not require it, or to attach a modest penalty to ring-
ing denunciations of behavior. Rome was not built in a day, and neither was
Rome Cable;146 the "gerrymandered" market definitions that were used to
strike down monopolies and mergers during the 1960s and 1970s were built
up in the case law step by step, with each step seeming a logical and even a
necessary extension of its predecessors. The ostensibly revolutionary Conti-
nental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania1 7 is now more than a decade old. Yet
the Court remains confusingly silent and we must continue to guess at Syl-
vania's implications, although most antitrust academics worth their salt
have offered rival visions of exactly what it means.
It requires a good deal of chutzpah in a judge to play the antitrust
game at all. Justice Tom Clark, for example, previously headed President
Truman's Antitrust Division and adopted a cautious and conservative ap-
proach to antitrust while on the Bench. 48 Clark could nevertheless describe
the judicial ideology as follows:
Antitrust is not a riddle in which the participants try to guess
the answer syllable by syllable. . . .The problem is simple. Are
the parties keeping within the law? The evidence is no guess-
work either. Perhaps the economists try to reduce it to an
enigma, but the court is able to see through their gyrations and
come out about right.1 9
Justice McReynolds, another conservative in antitrust, expressed similar
sentiments in a more mystical way: Sherman Act proscriptions cannot "be
evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure of right and wrong
. ..and the judgment of the courts cannot. . . set up against it . . .some
146. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (invalidating
merger between a leading producer of aluminum cable and a small producer of aluminum and
copper cable, by manipulating market definitions).
147. 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967). GTE thus applies a rule of reason to a vertical (manufacturer to dealer) allocation
of a sales territory, but leaves unclear whether this rule of reason (rather than a per se rule) is
to apply to other categories of restraint of trade - categories where precedents other than
Schwinn require that the per se rule be applied.
148. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Theater
Enter., Inc, v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
149. Clark, A Judicial View, in ANTITRUST AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE BENCH AS
AN ECONOMIC FORUM 17, 18 (1968) (proceedings of Conference Board's 7th Conference on
Antitrust Issues). See also J. VAN CISE, supra note 47, at 23 (a court treats an antitrust case
like a doctor would a patient, applying general knowledge in light of particular symptoms);
Austin, The Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 903, 904 (1972) (citing
Kaysen and Turner's discussion of the view that antitrust "proscription descends automatically
upon the appearance of certain market disturbances"). But see supra note 145 and accompa-
nying text.




A significant factor in avoiding uncertainty in antitrust becomes the
judges' faith in their ability to avoid it. McReynolds' and Clark's confidence
in themselves and in "the law" is essential to eliminating the paralyzing
indecisiveness over antitrust issues displayed by Justice Frankfurter in
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States' in 1949. Such indeci-
siveness grew apace on the Burger Court that was not self-confident, lead-
ing Lawrence Sullivan to observe that:
[Djicta about the Sherman Act's "indeterminacy" may have a
self-fulfilling quality if the Court in future decisions treats as
uncertain what by its own standards should be a clear analysis.
When fairness and efficiency indicate a need to limit and sys-
tematize analysis the Court should respond by defining and fol-
lowing the necessary inquiry rather than by disparaging the pre-
dictability of the process." 2
Should we join Thomas Arthur and lay all of the uncertainty I have
outlined at the feet of a constitutionalized yet standardless antitrust? With-
out blaming the effect on constitutionalization, we can agree with Arthur
that a doctrinal incoherence makes both antitrust litigation and advising
business clients costly and uncertain of result. Courts should try not to pun-
ish good faith business planning. We can accept Arthur's assertion that the
narrow margin for business error under the antitrust laws creates a "chil-
ling effect on ancillary restraints," without accepting his conclusion that
this is "inconsistent with the 1890 Congress' choice."' 153 Antitrust policy
150. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930) (quoting
Standard Sanitary Manf. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912). But see supra note
145 and accompanying text.
151. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). After agonizing over his decision for many pages, Justice
Frankfurter opts for a "plain meaning" interpretation, id. at 311, reminiscent of United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896). See supra note 83.
Congress has authoritatively determined that those practices [exclusive dealing contracts]
are detrimental where their effect may be to lessen competition [under Section 3 of the
Clayton Act]. It has not left at large for determination in each case the ultimate de-
mands of the "public interest," as the English lawmakers ... have recently chosen to do.
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 311. This is a good description of the self-restraint advocated by
Frankfurter but rejected by Justices Black and Douglas. See supra note 126 and accompany-
ing text.
152. Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 329
(1979) (footnotes ommitted) (discussing United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422
(1978)). See also infra text accompanying note 164. This comment can also be applied to
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). See supra notes 95, 147. Arthur, supra note 1, at 325, approves of Gypsum as a
recognition of the damage done to an antitrust rule of law by other cases!
153. Arthur, supra note 1, at 343-44. See also id. at 268, 290, 334, 375; supra notes 93,
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must rely on deterrence for its success. Few violations are detected, much
less prosecuted, and a "chilling effect" encourages businesses to keep well
clear of violating the antitrust laws while allowing courts to take some ac-
count of good faith efforts to comply with the laws' strictures. The Chicago
School has convinced some people that this chilling effect markedly de-
creases the efficiency of business, but the jury is still out on the question.
For example, there is no consensus among judges or legislators over how to
deal with the kind of business planning Arthur claims is hurt most by a
standardless delegation - planning for "joint activity" with competitors or
distributors.154 To some, such planning looks suspiciously like an anticom-
petitive restraint of trade to some.
Thomas Arthur's many interesting examples do not add up to prove his
conclusion that courts regularly make antitrust policy wholesale, under a
standardless delegation. Antitrust courts, he says, frequently encroach on
the legislative sphere, thwarting the majority will by acting like unac-
credited regulatory agencies or like Old Testament lawgivers. His encroach-
ment argument is plausible only under outmoded notions of a separation of
powers, and it was the inability to hold business power accountable under
such notions that led to the constitutionalization of antitrust in the first
place. A court has to adopt a regulatory approach to the regulations of
antitrust, at least when it reviews actions taken by the FTC under stan-
dards the court might not accept if it were not deferring to the FTC's ex-
pertise.1 55 Such judicial behavior is incomprehensible under the common
law of Addyston,156 but it is consistent with the intent of the Congress that
created the FTC in 1914 and with the delegation doctrine which began to
develop in the 1920s. The Court or the FTC also acts as an antitrust law-
giver on occasion because Congress has not acted more specifically and the
Court or FTC must step in to protect persons or property. As with the
Constitution, the generality and vagueness of the Sherman Act provoke
"the broadest and possibly most difficult . . . lawmaking." The Court has
"free rein," but "only so far as it is probably a matter of indifference,
95, 97-104, 107 and accompanying text.
154. Arthur, supra note 1, at 323. See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (courts should not engage in too-broad of an economic investigation,
since businesspeople must be able to assess the competitive consequences of a merger before
the fact); supra notes 35-36, 77 and accompanying text (some of the failures of traditional
separation of powers notions); supra note 95. Compare Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (permitting, under a rule of reason, planning through territorial
divisions agreed by a manufacturer and its distributors), with United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1971) (prohibiting such planning, under the per se rule, among grocery
store owners who formed an association).
155. See John Bene & Sons v. FTC, 299 F. 468 (2d Cir. 1924), quoted supra at text
accompanying note 77; Arthur, supra note 1, at 328; supra notes 78, 115 and accompanying
text. But see Arthur, supra note 1, at 328, 329 n.367.
156. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
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under the statute and its proper context, which of the available implement-
ing alternatives it selects."'" 7
Properly understood, the Court's antitrust lawmaking is not standard.
It is implicitly but consistently guided by the oldest canon of statutory con-
struction: "suppress the mischief and advance the remedy"' 58 that Congress
had in mind. The Sherman Act is a vital and dynamic element in American
life, and the "mischief" and the Court's understanding of it will thus
change from time to time. 159 Antitrust is not standardless in another sense;
its criteria are precedent-bound, much more so than in most other fields of
law. With one exception,16 0 the Illinois Brick"' doctrine is strictly adhered
to in antitrust: "we must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis
weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free
to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation. This presumption of
adherence to our prior decisions" supports the reaffirmation of a precedent
we may not want to follow for other reasons.' 2 Arthur admits that Con-
gress can at most "make basic policy choices for courts to apply in good
faith to individual cases." 16 This is basically what happens. No one has
recently accused the Court of bad faith in dealing with the ferocious com-
157. R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 240 (emphasis supplied). See also supra notes
44-48, 126 and accompanying text.
158. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. Ch. 1584).
159. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 245-47 (quoting C. Curtis) ("[bletter be
prophetic than archaeological, better deal with the future than the past"); id. at 245; J.
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 16, 27-28, 41-42; C. MERRIAM, supra
note 45, at 14; Limbaugh, supra note 46, at 224 n.36 (citing antitrust cases which arguably
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, but which do not cite Heydon's Case); supra
notes 44-48 and accompanying text. See also C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 45, at 149-53 (rules of
interpretation can be "thrown to the winds" while securing the "concordance of the written
law and the prevalent sense of right," yet "the real character of the rule cannot be changed by
giving it the name of construction"). Id. But see also R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 81-82
(warning that Heydon's Case encourages idle speculations which go beyond appropriate evi-
dence of legislative intent).
160. See supra note 147.
161. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
162. Id. at 736 (citation omitted) (White, J.). See also, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa
County Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982) quoted infra at text accompanying note 164; United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1971). Admittedly, the Illinois Brick
doctrine prevailed by only a 5-4 vote in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1983). Arthur seems confusingly wrong on this point, while arguing that the Court does not
adhere to a settled statutory construction in antitrust; the precedents of a constitutionalized
antitrust can thus be overruled because they are too confused to create reliance interests.
Adopting the Addyston criteria would put the onus of reformulating the Sherman Act back
where it belongs - on Congress. Arthur, supra note 1, at 270, 308, 330, 332. See supra note
3.
163. Arthur, supra note 1, at 276. See id. at 290: where the "common law failed to
provde operational legal rules," for antitrust, a court must "develop" them to implement basic
congressional policies. Fine, but the Addyston criteria have failed over time to provide "opera-
tional legal rules," see supra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
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plexities of antitrust. Precedents in antitrust occasionally receive a hypocrit-
ical treatment from the courts, but this occurs no more often than in many
other fields of law and certainly less often than in constitutional law.
Justice Stevens summarizes the process thusly: "[b]y articulating the
rules of [antitrust] law with some clarity and by adhering to rules that are
justified in their general application, . . . we enhance the legislative prerog-
ative to amend the law."' " Willard Hurst adds that the "original delega-
tion may be tentative and general, but may gain more legislative direction
. ..by legislative silence in the face of administrative action or court rul-
ings brought specifcally to the attention of legislators."' 65 We can count on
sophisticated and affluent plaintiffs and defendants to call each and every
important antitrust decision to Congress' attention. The deep morality of
following rules with which courts supervise market relationships (subject to
Congress changing the rules) provides the "rule of law" that Thomas Ar-
thur cannot find in antitrust. 6 Antitrust generalities are eagerly sought by
courts to make their difficult task easier, yet courts mistrust vague generali-
ties; the distinction between the two turns on the intellectual respectability
of the generality's subsuming principle. For example, it "may seem a far
cry from the might of the railroad magnate to a section in a motion picture
distribution contract, yet the cases under the Sherman Act treating of both
were aimed at unnatural growth and maintenance of control."' 67 Whether
such a principle, "unnatural growth and maintenance of control," is re-
spectable intellectually often turns on the evaluator's ideological disposition.
164. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 354. See also text accompanying supra note 152. But see
infra note 165.
165. J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra note 46, at 17. But see also R. DICK-
ERSON, supra note 83, at 179 (subsequent legislative action or inaction can be a basis for
determining current intent, but it is a "highly unreliable" basis for determining original in-
tent). It is also difficult to prove that the legislature is aware of the relevant decision; legisla-
tors may be busy with what they think are more important matters. Id. at 181.
166. See id. at 247 (fidelity to the coherence of the legal order as a curb on judicial
discretion); J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM I, 8, 10, 33, 106 (1964). But see Arthur, supra note 1, at
325-26, 376.
A fear of the arbitrary and the expedient gives legalism its political force. J. SHKLAR,
supra, at 15. When legalism "becomes self-conscious, when it challenges other-views, it is a
full-blown ideology." Id. at 10. Legalism (or the rule of law) is the belief that legal rules are
superior to individualized choices. A. MELONE, supra note 32, at 208. See also J. ELY, supra
note 47, at 4.
167. E. HODGES, THE ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 92 (1941). See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) on the often-used
but rather vague distinction between natural and unnatural growth in Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act monopolization cases.
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V1. SUMMARY: THE POLITICS OF ANTITRUST
In this article I have argued that much of the uncertainty in antitrust
results from causes other than its constitutionalization, properly understood.
There are procedural shortcomings; uncertainties of political climate; a re-
curring incompetence and a vested interest in the complexity that can be
bent to one's advantage; and a confusion of means with ends, of theory with
practice, and of what "is" in antitrust with what "ought" to be - and vice
versa. Antitrust law often lags behind socio-economic changes and then
tries to catch up all at once. A hodge-podge of antitrust precedents accumu-
lating over different historical stages in legal analysis causes a great deal of
uncertainty, particularly with regard to the amount of formalism or neo-
formalism a court will incorporate in a particular decision.' 8
Judges have devised means for coping with the uncertainties of anti-
trust, many of which are extrapolations from the ordinary "legal process"
means used to ameliorate uncertainty in other fields of the law. Judges have
also adopted the Constitution as a symbol and a model for the wisdom,
balance, caution, and judicial self-confidence needed in antitrust. As in con-
stitutional law, judges apparently court the approval of antitrust academics
and/or Congress by displaying appropriate values and organizational ac-
commodations, by trying to reach principled decisions which maintain some
play in the joints and transcend case facts and the politics of the day. Un-
fortunately, the loose interest balancing sometimes seen in antitrust is no
more conducive to certainty than it is in constitutional law. Nevertheless,
courts consistently try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy
Congress had in mind, in precedent-bound ways that Congress can always
change.'1 9 This is the main difference between a constitutionalized antitrust
and the Constitution itself.
The judges having done their best with antitrust, much uncertainty re-
mains. Some of this uncertainty reflects failures of judicial and scholarly
imaginations, but much of it reflects failures in political processes, what the
Chicago School might term political market failures, and attempts to ame-
liorate these failures. The uncertainty flowing from this amelioration is an
uncertainty with a purpose, the curbing of a Madisonian vice of faction that
comes to light only when broad historical trends in antitrust are examined.
Maintaining an ad hoc balance of power among groups jockeying their way
through ever-shifting circumstances is bound to spawn legal uncertainties,
but the Madisonian endeavor is so important that we must put up with
these uncertainties. Such a use of antitrust laws is justified because their
legislative history is ambiguous and the broader history of their times di-
168. See supra notes 27, 53, 111-35, 139 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 40, 51, 57, 73-74, 138, 143-45, 149-51, 158, 160-66 and accompa-
nying text.
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rectly supports a Madisonian antitrust. Even Thomas Arthur recognizes
that society "must often accept a degree of uncertainty in order to regulate
dangerous activities that are difficult to define."' 17 0
The mere consistency of static antitrust rules is not truth, and the most
we can hope for is that an approximate or conventional truth will emerge
from a hierarchy of antitrust values that evolve in a dialectical or zig-zag
fashion. The economics of maintaining competition, which the Chicago
School would transmute into the maximizing of efficiency or consumer wel-
fare, certainly takes a high place in this hierarchy. Its place in the hierar-
chy is just below certain political ideals, however. This position is shown by
the way courts resolve the infrequent conflicts that have arisen between effi-
ciency and the political ideals' I call accountability and an economic fed-
eralism. Under them, antitrust courts seek to counter ambition with ambi-
tion, so as to approximate a State neutrality and integrity. Notions of what
amounts to neutrality and integrity change from time to time, and these
.notions are always subject to "Cramer's dilemma."' 72 As the antitrust "bal-
ance wheel," courts thus regularly inquire into the means and ends of cor-
porate and governmental power. A modicum of representation is given the
unrepresented and the poorly organized, such as consumers. Yet courts try
to avoid creating additional veto groups that can paralyze governmental or
business activity, and courts try to abstain from making antitrust policy out
of personal preferences. Pursuing a doctrine of permissible power, courts
move toward a more democratic economy by seeking to insure that power is
used competently and fairly for public purposes. Chicagoans are angered by
the fact that, under a constitutionalized antitrust, we are not indifferent
170. Arthur, supra note 1, at 325. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. But
see Arthur, supra note 1, at 301, 320, 346, 367. See also supra note 5.
171. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580; Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344; and Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 427, are the only
apparent examples of political values explicitly conflicting with efficiency. Political values win,
and these precedents have been shaken only slightly by direct hits from the Chicago School.
The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (June 14, 1984) cast serious doubt on the
continued vitality of these precedents. But these guidelines will likely be repealed by the next
president's antitrust administrators. See J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY, supra note 16, at 11; Arthur, supra note 1, at 319 (efficiency too general and adapt-
able a goal to produce consistent results in antitrust litigation); supra note 107 and accompa-
nying text.
Economics gives focus to antitrust interpretations but does not lay down a blueprint for
the law. Economics theories are inadequate in some areas and conflict in other areas. The data
required to manipulate economics theories is frequently unavailable within a reasonable time
and expenditure of other resources. Because antitrust does not exist in a vacuum, it operates
within the parameters of other governmental policies. I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
7, §§ 105, 107. Nevertheless, "populist goals ... are substantially served by a pro-competitive
policy framed in economic terms." Id. § 105, at 13.
172. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 6-16, 18, 25, 29-31,
35, 41-43, 95 and accompanying text.
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ANTITRUST
about how wealth gets distributed among large and small producers, dis-
tributors, and consumers.'"
Americans attach great importance to these kinds of accountability,
probably because ours is a "thin" political consensus, limited to the proce-
dures rather than the substance of governance. 17 ' By forestalling an exces-
sive power used to pursue a private self-interest, accountability mechanisms
seek to keep enough power in reserve to implement such genuinely public
purposes as may be agreed upon. One of the few things members of the
antitrust manage A trois - corporate managers; senior officials at the Anti-
trust Division, and at the FTC, to a lesser extent; and Supreme Court jus-
tices - have in common is that they in roughly equal measure exercise a
power that floats free of its social base. They are subject to far fewer of the
cross-cutting influences brought to bear on, for example, members of Con-
gress and the President. They are usually accountable to none but them-
selves or, what amounts to the same thing, to their organization. Corporate
management "appoints the board and the board endorses management in a
mystical self-perpetuating process, which albeit efficient, is plainly illegiti-
mate. . . . Ideologically, . . [the large corporation] has become a mere
collection of persons and matter with considerable potential power .. .
floating dangerously in a philosophic limbo.' ' 7 5 Antitrust Division and FTC
officials do not face voters or shareholders, and they do not issue profit-and-
loss statements or stocks which rise and fall. Like business executives, they
are subject to occasional takeovers by persons much like themselves, and to
occasional congressional and judicial inquiries, which seldom prove much of
a hindrance. Federal judges have lifetime tenure, of course.17
Capturing free-floating (unaccountable) power by organizational
means usually proves a good "investment." It takes little power to capture
the "float," relative to the power the float then exerts on your behalf. Func-
tionally-similar government bureaus, trade associations, rate bureaus, mo-
nopolists, would-be monopolists, price leaders, and so forth capture the float
173. See supra notes 39-42, 47-48, 75-76, 80, 95 and accompanying text.
174. See R. BELLAH, supra note 10, at 287. See also supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
175. G. LODGE, THE NEw AMERCAN IDEOLOGY 206, 208 (1978). See United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 377 (D. Mass. 1953), afd per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954), quoted supra at note 41; Bock, Overview, in CONCENTRATION: ISSUES, CONVIC-
TIONS AND FACTS 1, 4 (1976) (Conference Bd. Antitrust Forum Bull. No. 9); J. LANDIS, supra
note 15, at 10-1I1, quoted supra at text accompanying note 28; supra notes 42, 140-53 and
accompanying text.
176. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 21, at 42-43, quoted supra at note 28; Mc-
Craw, supra note 15, at 171. See R. BORK, supra note 5, at 416 (the Division and the FTC
are "their own clients," with "little at stake other than their own theory"); K. & P.
DOLBEARE, supra note 18, at 229 (main differences in American ideologies concern where
power is located and the nature of the political process); Samuels, supra note 42, quoted supra
at note 42.
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in various economic and political markets, to entrench a strategic position
and to make scapegoats of rivals. Intense competitions among rivals fre-
quently result in temporary captures only. An instability of power renders
unstable the balance of antitrust arguments justifying or refuting the power
of the float. This is particularly so when an inevitable overreaching leaves a
powerholder in an exposed position - the position of the courts and of big
business late in the 1920s, and of the Antitrust Division and the FTC in the
late 1970s.11
While the immediate goal of antitrust arguments is to forestall or win
a lawsuit, there is also a vague, longer-term aim of converting power into
authority by reducing the public distrust of your unaccountable power. In
the end, the message of all antitrust ideologues is the same: "[tirust us and
all will be well, for we know what we're doing." It is the granting and
withholding of legitimacy to such claims that takes antitrust the furthest
away from an economics goal of maintaining competition in markets for
goods and services. Even as they watch each other jealously, antitrust plain-
tiff, defendant, and judge are joint venturers in the legitimation of our sys-
tem for allocating power - just like their colleagues who manipulate the
political constitution. Apart, perhaps, from a few Chicagoans, no one thinks
that legitimation comes cheap, and everyone except those seeking radical
changes in the system think legitimation worthwhile.
177. Joffe,'supra note 15, at 43; McCraw, supra note 15, at 159. See A. BERLE, supra
note 36, at 148 (political and economic power always interact but do not merge, and they
seldom take over each other's decisionmaking functions permanently); R. NEELY, How
COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 102 (1981) (any bureaucracy seeks power and influence, and it
will overreach to attain them). See also T. ARNOLD, supra note 18, at 113-14 (successful
attacks on American democracy come from political and industrial machines seizing arbitrary
power without a frontal attack).
During the 1960s, Robert Moses sought power through New York State public economic
enterprises, and he used patronage to immunize his influence. Moses was powerful in the polit-
ical parties but never succeeded in attracting voters. A. BERLE, supra note 36, at 152. In
another example from New York, Consolidated Edison assumed that it could make the trade-
offs between electric power and environmental quality. Communicating with consumers in full-
page ads, it sought to overcome public antagonism with political and financial "clout," and to
keep government off balance with assertions of private property rights and the limited role of
the State. These tactics permitted wasteful and uncoordinated interventions for some purposes
by, e.g., the Scenic Hudson River Preservation Society. G. LODGE, supra note 175, at 212-13.
A more neutral characterization is that Consolidated carelessly left loose ends, bits of free-
floating power that environmentalists and government agencies could mop up and consolidate
for their own purposes.
[Vol. 22
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1988], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss2/2
